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Abstract
The Hubble Space Telescope has demonstrated that on-orbit servicing can provide
significant benefits for scientific space programs. Specifically, servicing missions can
replace failed components to keep spacecraft operational, and can upgrade onboard
components to improve spacecraft performance. Hubble was able to capture these
benefits because it was designed to be serviceable; however, many other programs
have excluded serviceability from the design due to cost considerations. Often, the
value of serviceability cannot be quantitatively justified. This thesis develops a frame-
work to determine the value of including serviceability in a space telescope.
Various principles to evaluate serviceability are proposed throughout the litera-
ture, and this thesis incorporates three main principles to construct the framework.
First, the costs and benefits of servicing are separated so that the “cost” of servicing
is expressed as the maximum price the customer is willing to pay. Second, the value
of serviceability will be determined by comparing a telescope servicing program to a
telescope replacement program. Third, the value of flexibility provided by servicing
is analyzed by a Monte-Carlo simulation and decision rule analysis.
A case study was performed to demonstrate how the framework is used, using
representative data from Hubble. For a simple space telescope, the case study calcu-
lated the increase in science return gained by servicing and the maximum price for
servicing missions. The case study illustrated an important trade between science
return and risk of telescope downtime. Finally, the principles and techniques used in
this framework are more generally applicable to non-revenue generating spacecraft.
Thesis Supervisor: David W. Miller
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) has provided an unprecedented glimpse into the
structure of the universe. Throughout its first eleven years of operation, HST has
produced about 420,000 images, observed over 17,000 targets, and contributed to
over 3,200 scientific papers [1]. The success of HST lies partly in the use of on-orbit
servicing. Servicing is the act of physically replacing, modifying, and/or upgrading
components on an operational spacecraft in its deployed environment. As of 2007,
four servicing missions have been sent to HST, with a fifth currently scheduled for
2008. HST is serviced by astronauts through extra-vehicular activity (EVA) and
supported by the Space Shuttle, as shown in Figure 1-1.
The Hubble Space Telescope
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Figure 1-1: HST being serviced by astronauts and the Space Shuttle
Servicing can be used to maintain a spacecraft to keep it operational throughout its
nominal mission duration, which is the minimum lifetime of the spacecraft mandated
by its operators. Maintenance is required for complex spacecraft such as telescopes
that are intended to last for an extended life, since it is infeasible and uneconomical to
be designed to remain operational for decades without assistance; for example, HST
was designed with a nominal mission duration of 20 years [1]. Each HST servicing
mission replaced failed components with new, and often improved, components. As
a result, HST has been almost continuously operational from its deployment in 1990
through to 2007.
Servicing can also upgrade components on the spacecraft to improve performance.
In particular, the science instruments can be upgraded with new technology to in-
crease their resolution and sensitivity. The HST servicing missions have replaced the
instrument several times, and those currently installed on the telescope are orders of
magnitude more accurate than the original instruments. This has kept HST on the
cutting-edge of astronomical research, and continued servicing will keep it there for
the foreseeable future. The net result of servicing is a telescope that has successfully
operated throughout its mission and provided ever-increasing science capabilities.
These benefits of servicing do not come for free. The servicing missions themselves
have considerable direct and indirect costs. The fifth servicing mission, which like
the previous four will be Shuttle-based, has an expected price tag of $900M [2], and a
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cancelled plan for a robotic servicing mission to HST would have cost between $1.7B
and $2.4B1 [3]. In order to perform servicing on a telescope, it must first be designed
with serviceability, that is, the ability to be serviced by an external agent, whether
human or robotic. HST was designed with doors to provide access to internal systems,
the components were modularized to allow easy removal, and the instruments were
designed to be swapped with new ones. Incorporating these design features incur
additional costs before the telescope is launched, but without these features, it is
extremely difficult (if not impossible) to service the telescope. Clearly, the decision
to include serviceability in a telescope design must be made during the design phase.
Serviceability has been excluded from telescope designs in the past because the
cost of serviceability couldn’t be justified. The Chandra X-Ray Observatory was
originally intended to operate in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and be serviced via the
Space Shuttle. When cost constraints required the mission to be descoped, the plan
to service the telescope was abandoned, and the intended orbit was switched to a
highly elliptical one instead of LEO [4]. This dilemma is at the heart of the issue
of telescope servicing. Scientists, engineers, NASA administrators, and policy mak-
ers all understand the benefits associated with servicing telescopes, but they often
cannot justify the added costs associated with enabling this benefit captures. When
budgetary pressures appear, serviceability is dropped from designs.
What is needed is a method to quantitatively determine the value of serviceability,
so engineers and program managers have the information needed to make the decision.
For space systems that generate revenue as a benefit, the value of serviceability can
be easily calculated using standard economic valuation techniques. Consider the
example of a commercial communications satellite constellation. The benefits of the
system are the revenues from subscribers to the service. Servicing operations can
modify satellites to support more subscribers, which can potentially increase revenue
[5]. Since both the benefits and costs of servicing are measured using the same
units (dollars), the decision to service a satellite (and to design the satellites to be
1This was the estimated range from the team that developed an HST robotic servicing concept.
An independent audit of the program revealed that the actual cost could have been much higher.
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serviceable) can be made on a standard Net Present Value (NPV) analysis [6]. In this
example, the question becomes: are the up-front costs of serviceability and the costs
of servicing missions repaid by the increase in future cash flows due to the improved
system performance?
In the case of space telescopes, however, the benefit that the system generates
is science data, rather than revenues. Science data has no monetary equivalent, so
a standard NPV analysis cannot be used; with the benefits and costs in different
units, there is no direct way to combine these metrics into a single quantity that can
guide the decision. Absent any budgetary restrictions, scientists would clamour to
include serviceability in design and set aside funds to pay for servicing missions in
the future to install new, advanced instruments. However, when budget pressures
are applied, all telescope features are critically analyzed to determine if they should
remain in the design or removed to save cost. Without a method to analyze the value
of serviceability, it will often be dropped because the cost cannot be justified.
Furthermore, the telescope program is subject to many sources of uncertainty.
For example, the mean time to failure for components can be calculated, but the
telescope failure time is not known a priori. As well, the future instrument technology
that is installed onboard depends on the time of servicing, which affects the overall
science return of the telescope. Furthermore, the servicing missions themselves have
a likelihood of failure. The mission may fail to service the telescope, or it may
inadvertently disable or destroy the telescope; each of these events has a probability
associated with it. Any method of calculating the value of serviceability must account
for these sources of uncertainty.
There is a need for a method to analyze the value of including serviceability in the
design of a telescope. The goal of this thesis is to develop a framework to perform
this analysis. The current state of research will be discussed in Chapter 2, which
will motivate the specific research questions that must be addressed. The general
principles that will be used in the framework to answer these questions are described
in Chapter 3. The framework itself will be constructed in Chapter 4. Finally, the
framework will be demonstrated through a case study in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
The State of Research:
Literature Review
This chapter will investigate research into telescope servicing, which is a specialized
segment of the general on-orbit servicing field. On-orbit servicing in turn falls into
the broader class of real options theory. This can be thought of as a funnel which
narrows down towards telescope servicing, as illustrated in Figure 2-1.
This chapter is organized by starting at the top of the funnel and gradually working
down to the specific field of telescope servicing, and specific areas of interest will be
Options Theory
Spacecraft
Servicing
Telescope
Servicing
RESEARCH GAP
Figure 2-1: The hierarchy of servicing research
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highlighted along the way. The topics investigated in this literature review are the
following:
1. Define value as used in this thesis.
2. How can options theory be used to think about spacecraft servicing?
3. What are the benefits of servicing? How have these benefits been demonstrated
on HST?
4. What are the costs of servicing?
5. Examine current research into the value of spacecraft servicing.
6. Examine current research into the value of telescope servicing in particular.
7. Identify the research gap that this thesis will address.
2.1 What is Value?
Spacecraft servicing has not been widely adopted partly as a result of misconceptions
on the part of engineers about the concept of value. Although engineers may share
the view that spacecraft servicing is “valuable”, in many cases this is confused with
the concept that spacecraft servicing can generate many benefits.
This confusion can be seen even in programs where servicing has been clearly
demonstrated as valuable. For example, in the NASA media guide for the fourth
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), a short section entitled “The
Value of Servicing” states that:
Hubble’s visionary modular design allows NASA to equip it with new,
state-of-the-art instruments every few years. These servicing missions en-
hance the Telescope’s science capabilities, leading to fascinating new dis-
coveries about the universe. Periodic service calls also permit astronauts
to “tune up” the Telescope and replace limited-life components [1].
22
Figure 2-2: Example of focussing on benefits when discussing the value of servicing
(from Lester [7])
Another example is from a presentation on the inclusion of serviceability in the
design of a future space telescope. Most of the slides in the presentation discuss pro-
posals for the servicing architecture and implications of serviceability on design, but
one slide is devoted to the “value of servicing”, and shown in Figure 2-2. The value,
according to the presenter, is clearly apparent from a graph of increasing instrument
capabilities, implying that servicing can allow new and advanced instruments to be
installed in the future [7]. This is correct; however the title of the slide, “Value of
Servicing is Well Understood”, is somewhat misleading.
Both of these examples share a common issue: the “value” of servicing as presented
ignores the cost of servicing. Serviceability is worthless (i.e., has no value) if servicing
missions are prohibitively expensive, or the necessary modifications to the telescope
to enable servicing are too extreme. No matter how much benefit can be gained from
servicing, if the associated costs (monetary or otherwise) are too high, servicing is not
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valuable. In addition, the benefits themselves are often expressed qualitatively. The
graph in Figure 2-2 merely demonstrates that instrument technology will significantly
improve. How does this change the science return of a telescope, and by how much?
It is often unclear exactly how a telescope program will gain from servicing, save for
a fuzzy notion that servicing will improve science capabilities.
The net result of these difficulties is that serviceability is often left out of telescope
design studies. Even if it is included in the design, it is often removed when budgeting
and scheduling pressures start to mount. If engineers cannot quantitatively justify
the serviceability, it is unlikely to be present in the final design.
Clearly, a more satisfactory definition of value is needed, and there have been
several proposed in the literature. Murman [8] defines value in terms of a business
enterprise. He states that value comes from transactions that provide utility to an
organization. Specifically, Murman defines value as:
How various stakeholders find particular worth, utility, benefit, or reward
in exchange for their respective contributions to the enterprise.
These transactions both can provide utility (benefits) or payment for those benefits
(costs). Likewise, Rouse and Boff define value in the context of systems engineering as
“a fair return or equivalent in goods, services or money for something exchanged” [9].
The general theme in these definitions is that value comes from generating benefits
while incurring associated costs, neatly summarized by Crawley as “value is benefit
at cost” [10]. He states that a “good” architecture is one that delivers benefit at a
competitive cost. Thus to calculate the value, one must evaluate both benefits and
costs to determine if the benefits received justify the expense in generating them.
2.2 Options Theory
Serviceability can be considered as an option that is designed into a telescope program.
In its most general sense, an option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an
action in a specified time period and for a certain price [11]. Servicing fits well within
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this framework: telescope serviceability gives managers the right (but no obligation)
to service the telescope throughout its operational lifetime. However, serviceability
must be designed into the system before it is launched, so engineers and program
managers must decide to incorporate it into the initial telescope design. This section
discusses the various types of options in use in the business world, which will motivate
how the servicing option can be thought about.
2.2.1 Financial Options
Long before options were introduced as tools to analyze projects, they were used as
financial instruments. A financial option is a contract between two parties where the
option purchaser is given the right (but not the obligation) to either buy or sell an
asset in the future at a certain time. The asset to which the option applies to is called
the underlying asset. Underlying assets for options can be one of a wide variety of
financial instruments, such as shares, bonds, mutual funds, and foreign currencies.
Options became widely used in finance and business to either profit from unex-
pected gains or protect against risk. As a result, options were classified into two
primary types: A call option is the right to perform an action to take advantage of
a favourable opportunity, whereas a put option is the right to perform an action to
limit losses in a bad situation [12]. In the case of a stock option, a call allows the
holder to profit if the stock price goes high, and a put allows the holder to prevent
losses if the stock price goes low.
When one performs the action that the option allows, it is called exercising the
option. For both call and put options, purchasers spend money now to have the
opportunity to exercise the option in the future as conditions warrant. To determine
the value of an option, various mathematical treatments were developed, which are
further described in Chapter 3. The goal of these analyses is to determine how much
should be paid up-front to purchase the option and how much benefit can be realized.
The value of a financial option can be determined using the following parameters:
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• The initial cost of the option.
• The strike price of the underlying asset: the set price at which the asset must
be traded when the option is exercised.
• The expiration date of the option: the time period over which the option can
be exercised.
• The volatility of the underlying asset: the distribution of potential returns of
the asset over the life of the option. [11].
With this terminology, the stock option example can be expressed more formally. A
call option on a stock grants the purchaser the right to purchase the stock at the
strike price on or before the expiration date. A put option on a stock grants the right
to sell the stock at the strike price on or before the expiration date1 [6].
Financial options are attractive because their value is asymmetric. The option
holder will only exercise it when it is advantageous; for a call option, the holder will
only exercise it when the price of the asset (known as the spot price) is above the
strike price. Conversely, if the spot price is below the strike price, the holder will not
exercise the option, as it would lead to a net loss. So the holder can only have a net
benefit from the option; the option is exercised when profitable, and it is not exercised
if it would result in a loss [11]. The expected value of an option is always positive.
This comes with the important caveat that the option itself must be purchased in the
first place. Thus, if the option is not exercised, no loss is incurred, except for the
initial cost of the option.
Options are more valuable when the underlying asset has higher volatility, which
is defined in economics as the possible spread of the asset value [6]. In the case of
financial options, the underlying asset is more volatile if the distribution of asset price
is wider. Returning to the call option example, having a higher chance of the asset
price increasing means a greater expected payoff when the option is exercised. Of
1This discussion has focussed on American options, which can be exercised at any time before
the expiration date, rather than European options, which can be exercised only on the expiration
date. This distinction is not relevant to the discussion, so European options are omitted.
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course, along with a higher chance of price increases comes a higher chance of price
drops, but since the value of a call option (as with all options) is asymmetric, having
a greater chance of low prices is of no importance because no loss is incurred if the
price is low. Overall, the expected return of the option is greater for a more volatile
underlying asset.
The key insight from financial options theory is that uncertainty and risk are not
necessarily negative. In fact, uncertainty itself can be a source of value, since more
uncertainty (i.e. volatility) provides a chance of larger payoffs with no downside risk.
Options are instruments that can be used to capture this value. Again, this comes
with the important caveat that the option must be purchased first. The remaining
issue to be resolved with financial options is to determine if the up-front cost of
purchasing the option is justified by the potential future payoff.
2.2.2 Real Options
Financial options are limited to actions on financial instruments, but the concept of
creating an opportunity to perform actions in the future is more broadly applicable.
In the business world, companies often structure contracts to include provisions to
act if revenues or profits increase, or escape clauses that allows the company cut its
losses if conditions deteriorate. More generally, large business operations, such as
factories, refineries, and mines, are not designed and built to be static throughout
their lifecycles: changes are made depending on how demand or other business factors
evolve through time. Good designs are ones that allow for these changes to be made
without incurring very large expenses. All of these examples can be considered as
types of options, but instead of an option on a financial asset, these options are on
business projects. Thus this particular class of options are called real options, so
named because they act on real, tangible projects.
Similar to financial options, real options can be classified into one of two basic
types: call-like and put-like. Call-like real options are those that can be exercised to
capture benefits when the value of the project increases, such as the ability to increase
production at a factory if demand increases. Put-like real options are exercised to
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limit future losses, such as the ability to slow or halt production at a factory if
demand decreases [11]. In both of these cases, expenses may be incurred in order
to exercise the option. For the call option example, the factory manager may have
to increase wages to increase production or spend capital to expand the plant. The
option provides the opportunity to perform actions as future conditions warrant, and
without it those actions may be impractical or prohibitively expensive.
Another, complementary classification for real options, proposed by Richard de
Neufville, professor of Engineering Systems at MIT, concerns the level of knowledge
about the project design that is needed to purchase the real option. Real options,
of both the call-like and put-like varieties, can be considered either “on” or “in” a
project [11]. Real options “on” a project are activities that can be performed at the
project level without regard to its internal design, whereas a real option “in” the
system is one that is built into the system design itself. For example, consider a
mining project. If managers purchase land to provide a future opportunity to mine
natural resources, this is a real option “on” the project, since it is independent of the
eventual design of the mine. In contrast, if the mine is designed so that production
can be increased if other nearby deposits are found, this is an option “in” the system
since the design itself was altered.
This is similar to the ability of financial options to extract benefits from volatil-
ity and uncertainty, but whereas financial options manage uncertainty in underlying
assets, real options manage uncertainty in real projects. Furthermore, the value of a
real option (as with a financial option) stems from the ability to make decisions in
the future based on conditions as they happen. The ability to adapt to future events
provides management with a measure of flexibility. Flexibility is defined in [13] as
The ability of a system to adapt and respond to changes in its initial
objectives, requirements and environment occurring after the system is in
operation in a timely and cost-effective manner.
The key here is that built-in flexibility provides managers the ability to make
changes that are cost-effective. Many changes can be made after a project starts, but
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without the real option, the change may be prohibitively expensive.
Just as flexibility is valuable where there is uncertainty, flexibility is worthless
in a deterministic world. If future events are known in advance, the project can be
designed to maximize utility given this set of events, and the ability to make changes is
not valuable. In reality, the future contains uncertainty, so a real option provides the
ability to make changes in the future when managers have more information and the
uncertainty has been resolved. Furthermore, like their counterparts in the financial
world, real options are more valuable with greater uncertainty. Call-like real options
are more valuable when there is a higher chance that the conditions surrounding the
project improve, and the option can be exercised to capture additional value. In
contrast, put-like real options are valuable if there is a larger risk of negative events,
and the option can be exercised to cut losses.
The key question that remains is to find the value of the real option so that
planners know how much they should pay to incorporate the option into the project.
As with financial options, the specific option valuation techniques will be discussed
in Chapter 3.
2.2.3 Servicing as a Real Option
Servicing of space systems while deployed in orbit can be considered a real option
because servicing provides the flexibility to perform actions to improve benefits or
cut losses as future conditions warrant. The servicing real option can be loosely
described by the four parameters that describe a financial option. The analogue
between servicing as a real option and standard options are described in Table 2.1
and are discussed in more detail below.
First, the initial cost of the option corresponds to the cost of engineering, devel-
opment and fabrication associated with enabling servicing in the space system. In
the case of a serviceable satellite, the satellite must be designed with doors for ac-
cess by astronauts or robotic servicing systems, the replaceable components must be
modularized so that they can be removed and swapped easily, etc.
29
Table 2.1: Parameters for Financial Options and Analogues in Real Options
Parameter Financial Option Servicing Real Option
Analogue
Initial Cost Price of option contract on
purchase
Costs associated with incorpo-
rating serviceability in the ini-
tial design
Strike Price Price that the underlying asset
will be bought / sold when op-
tion is exercised
Costs associated with perform-
ing the servicing mission in the
future
Expiration Date Latest time when the option
can be exercised
Time period over which the op-
tion to service is available
Volatility Possible spread of asset prices
over life of option
Uncertainty in the perfor-
mance or other parameters of
the space system
Second, the strike price of the financial option corresponds to the cost of exercising
the servicing real option in the future. Although the servicing option was built in (or
purchased) during the design phase, the servicing mission itself will not be free. Costs
are incurred when the servicing mission is launched; including the cost of the servicing
spacecraft, replacement components, launch, and operations. The costs incurred may
not end after servicing is complete: the system may be modified and so the operations
costs may change.
Third, both financial and real options have an expiration date because there may
be only a fixed time interval over which the options can be exercised. Normally, a
spacecraft can be serviced throughout its operational life, but there may be cases
where servicing cannot be exercised past a certain time. For example, if a spacecraft
requires a large amount of propellant to manoeuvre into position to be serviced, it
may not be available later into the mission when fuel is depleted, although it still
may be able to continue normal operations.
Finally, the volatility underlying a financial option corresponds to various sources
of uncertainty in a telescope program. The value of the servicing real option increases
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if the underlying uncertainty associated with the space system is high. Consider a
space system whereby servicing missions are sent to repair components that failed
prematurely. If there is no uncertainty in the failure rate, it is possible for a spacecraft
to be designed with sufficient redundancy to last for the entire mission. In that case,
the spacecraft would not require servicing, and the value of serviceability is zero. On
the other hand, as the uncertainty in the failure time increases, so does the probability
of premature failure, which makes the option to service more valuable.
2.3 Benefits of Servicing
The benefit of the servicing real option is the flexibility it provides to respond to future
events. Nilchiani and others [14] categorizes three types of flexibility by the time
frame over which these changes occur: short-, medium-, and long-term. In the short-
term, components or the entire spacecraft may fail, which requires urgent repair or
replacement to ensure that the overall performance of the system is not compromised.
This is called emergency service flexibility. In the medium-term, changes in demand
may require the system to be adapted to support these changes. This is called volume
flexibility. In the long-term, the type of service demanded may change, requiring
more substantial changes to the system to fit the new mission need. This is called
mix flexibility.
These three flexibility types can be illustrated using the example of a constella-
tion of communications satellites, where the satellites provide service to terrestrial
subscribers [5]. In the event that a satellite is damaged, emergency service flexibility
allows the satellite to be repaired or replaced in order to maintain service. If demand
from the subscriber base sharply increases, volume flexibility allows the constellation
to be reconfigured by adding more satellites to meet demand. If subscribers demand
different services over time (for example, a shift from telephony to Internet service),
mix flexibility allows the satellites to be reconfigured to support the new service. To
enable these different types of flexibility, the system must be designed with a real
option that can be exercised as needed.
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Table 2.2: Benefits of servicing to Earth Observation Missions
Science Benefits
• The science data set is increased through more observation time.
• The science data set can be used in conjunction with other missions.
• Unique capabilities onboard a satellite can remain in operation
• Any unexpected science results gained during the nominal mission can
be investigated further.
Operational Benefits
• The satellite may still be useful and provide valuable data.
• Satellite procedures and/or technology can be further demonstrated or
validated.
• The satellite may be useful in future applications that are currently unan-
ticipated.
In the context of scientific missions, flexibility has already been explicitly recog-
nized as valuable for Earth observation missions (EOMs). At the end of the nominal
mission duration of a scientific satellite, the program undergoes a Senior Review to
determines if the satellite program should be extended past its nominal duration
[15]. The National Academy of Sciences commissioned a report to investigate the
circumstances in which EOMs should be extended. The report found seven benefits
to extend EOMs, summarized in Table 2.2, categorized as either benefits related to
the acquisition of science data, or benefits related to continued spacecraft operations.
In addition to adding benefits to a program, flexibility can be used to protect
programs against risk. Joppin [16] identifies four sources of risk are important for
space systems that are deployed over medium- to long mission durations, which can
be mitigated by incorporating flexibility into the system:
• Risk of system failure: The system fails prematurely due to component wearout,
random failures, or design errors, and is unable to satisfy its intended mission
duration without intervention.
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• Risk of commercial obsolescence The actual market demand profile is drastically
different than the assumed demand profile used during the design phase, and
the system either cannot satisfy demand or has too much capacity.
• Risk of technology obsolescence: Technology on the spacecraft is made obsolete
by new developments on the ground and so the spacecraft becomes less useful
to customers.
• Risk of change in customer requirements : The desires of the customers change
over time, and the new desires cannot be served by the system as originally
designed [16].
These four risks can map onto the three types of flexibility described by Nilchiani.
System failure is a short-term issue that can be immediately addressed via emergency
service flexibility. Commercial obsolescence can either be an inability to meet the level
of demand (which can be remedied by volume flexibility) or an inability to provide
the demanded type of service (remedied by mix flexibility). For both technological
obsolescence and requirements changes, the system needs to be reconfigured, which
is possible only with mix flexibility.
In a later paper, Joppin [17] analyzes the value of flexibility specifically for scien-
tific missions. She identifies four primary areas where the ability to service a science
mission can provide value over the mission lifetime:
• Mission salvage: The system is damaged before becoming operational. Without
the ability to service, the mission is an immediate failure.
• Repair and maintenance: As components on the spacecraft fail, servicing mis-
sions can replace these components to ensure it can continue to operate. This
applies to both expected (wearout) failures and unexpected (random) failures.
• Instrument upgrades The instruments can be replaced to improve the science
return with newer technology. Also, if the objectives of principal investigators
change, the installed instruments may not be sufficient. For example, if an
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instrument is optimized for the infrared wavelength band but scientists want to
focus more on ultraviolet, the instrument must be replaced in order to satisfy
this new demand profile.
• Bus component upgrades : The supporting equipment, such as power systems,
onboard computers, or environment control, can be upgraded to drastically
improve science return even with the same instruments.
In summary, flexibility provided by servicing can theoretically provide a wide
range of benefits to a space mission. Servicing can both protect against bad conditions
(failures and risks) and provide increased benefits under good conditions (installation
of new technology through upgrades).
2.4 Servicing and the HST Experience
Previous sections have shown that the flexibility to perform servicing can potentially
provide significant benefits, but it is difficult to accurately quantify these benefits.
Fortunately, the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) has clearly demonstrated these ben-
efits on an actual telescope. HST was intended to replicate a ground observatory
in orbit [18]. Ground observatories are designed to be flexible so that they can be
upgraded with new instruments to remain on the leading edge of technology. This is
possible because ground observatories are readily accessible for maintenance, repair,
and upgrade activities. As well, the scientific instruments are generally kept sepa-
rate from the optical bench, so they can be removed and replaced as needed. An
observatory in orbit is more advantageous due to the more stable platform that space
provides: free from local vibrations, earthquakes, and most importantly, atmospheric
interference [19]. However, a space telescope is much more inaccessible than ground
telescopes due to its location, and components must be more integrated to save mass,
volume and cost. Despite these difficulties, the advantages of flexibility that are seen
with ground telescopes are still valid for space telescopes.
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HST was initially intended to be returned to Earth via the Shuttle to undergo
periodic maintenance, but in the end HST was designed to allow servicing in orbit by
astronauts performing extra-vehicular activity (EVA) [17]. The internal components
were modularized and designed such that they could be repaired or replaced by as-
tronauts during servicing missions, which were planned to occur approximately once
every three years [20]. As of 2007, four servicing missions have been sent to HST,
with a fifth mission scheduled for 2008 [21]. Table 2.3 provides a summary of the
components replaced by the four servicing missions [21, 22].
The flexibility to perform servicing operations on HST granted NASA the ability
to perform four categories of tasks:
• Preventive maintenance: Replace components subject to wearout before they
fail and cause suspension of HST operations.
• Corrective maintenance: Replace components if they fail prematurely and repair
flaws detected after deployment.
• Bus upgrades : Replace engineering components with improved hardware to
improve the lifetime and/or utility of HST.
• Instrument upgrades : Replace onboard scientific instruments with more ad-
vanced instruments [16].
These four categories are discussed in more detail below. Although both types of
maintenance (preventive and corrective) is usually considered together as one cate-
gory, the distinction is made between these two types by Waltz [23] since they are
each performed under different circumstances.
2.4.1 Preventive Maintenance
Components on HST do not last indefinitely. If the telescope is to operate for its
intended 15-year mission duration, these components need to be maintained or re-
placed. For example, HST depends on a set of six Rate Sensing Units (RSUs). Each
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Table 2.3: Summary of major HST components affected during servicing
Servicing Mission 1
• Replaced 4 of 6 Rate Sensing Units
• Replaced 2 of 2 Magnetometers
• Upgraded the flight computer coprocessor
• Replaced solar arrays
• Replaced solar array drive electronics
Servicing Mission 2
• Replaced 1 of 3 Fine Guidance Sensors
• Replaced 1 of 4 Reaction Wheel Assemblies
• Installed Optical Control Electronics Enhancement Kit
• Replaced Solar Array Drive Electronics
• Replaced Tape Recorder with Solid State Recorder
Servicing Mission 3A
• Replaced 6 of 6 Rate Sensing Units
• Replaced 1 of 3 Fine Guidance Sensors
• Installed Voltage/Temperature Improvement Kits
• Installed new computer (Intel 486)
• Upgraded Solid State Recorder
• Replaced thermal insulation blankets
Servicing Mission 3B
• Replaced 1 of 4 Reaction Wheel Assemblies
• Replaced solar arrays
• Replaced Power Distribution Unit
36
RSU contains gyroscopes and electronics to detect the orientation of HST and pro-
vide data for the reaction wheels to point the telescope [24]. Three of the six RSUs
are required to be functional for science operations. Since gyroscopes are subject to
wearout, the backup RSUs are brought online when the primaries fail, but without
intervention the number of functioning RSUs will eventually drop below the min-
imum of three, at which point telescope will cease operations. Servicing missions
were planned accordingly to replace gyroscopes as they wear out and to prevent the
number of functioning gyroscopes from dropping below three [25].
2.4.2 Corrective Maintenance
Not all events can be foreseen, so corrective maintenance operations perform repairs
on unexpected failures. The infamous example from HST was the error in the primary
mirror discovered immediately after launch, when the first images captured by HST
had a lower resolution than expected. After an investigation, NASA concluded that
the primary mirror had a slight spherical aberration flaw caused by manufacturing
errors, which caused light entering the telescope to converge away from the focal
plane [26]. To correct this problem, engineers designed the Corrective Optics Space
Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR) optics package, which was installed on the
first servicing mission to return HST to its designed specifications.
Corrective maintenance was also useful later into the life of HST. The gyroscopes
inside the RSUs wore out much sooner than anticipated, and by 1999 only two gy-
roscopes were functional. This caused HST to go into standby mode and suspend
science operations. A servicing mission was originally scheduled to launch in 2000
to perform preventive maintenance on the RSUs. Since the components failed ear-
lier than expected, the servicing mission was split in two, and the RSU replacement
portion of the mission was bumped up to December 1999. The original preventive
maintenance mission became a corrective one once HST ceased operations due to
hardware failure [25].
In both of these cases, the ability to perform corrective maintenance saved HST
from having a less productive and shorter lifetime than it has had so far.
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2.4.3 Bus Upgrades
Maintenance operations alone would keep HST running at its designed specifications
with no increase in science return. To act as a true observatory like its ground-based
counterparts, HST components were upgraded during servicing missions. Compo-
nents such as onboard processors, data storage, solar arrays, and control systems
were upgraded with new technology. These upgrades increased the overall telescope
performance by improving the characteristics of the supporting systems. For exam-
ple, upgrades to the onboard computer systems increased the data storage capability
from 3 GB at launch to 21 GB at present, which enabled better management of data
gathered by the instruments [27]. Furthermore, combinations of bus upgrades can
lead to systemic telescope improvements. For example, upgrades to the structure and
control systems reduced the peak jitter from 39 mas at launch to 14 mas at present
[27]. Clearly, both component-level and system-level improvements to the supporting
bus improved the science return of HST.
2.4.4 Instrument Upgrades
From the astronomer’s perspective, perhaps the most exciting type of servicing oper-
ation is the installation of new telescope instruments. HST has five bays for instru-
ments that can be accessed by astronauts so that instruments can be replaced during
servicing missions. Three of the four HST servicing missions included the installation
of new, state-of-the-art science instruments, and the fifth servicing mission planned
for 2008 will install two more. Figure 2-3 shows a timeline of the progression of sci-
ence instruments throughout the life of HST. Successive generations of instruments
have yielded an enormous increase in resolution and sensitivity in many wavelength
bands. For example, the Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS) is a third generation
instrument currently installed on HST. Compared to the first generation instrument
that was replaced, the instrument resolution has doubled and the field of view is over
40 times greater [28]. The net result is a huge increase in science return, both in data
quantity and quality.
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Figure 2-3: Timeline of instruments installed on HST (adapted from NASA [29])
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2.4.5 Overall Impact
Through maintenance and upgrades, the servicing missions have significantly in-
creased the science return of the telescope from its original design. Figure 2-4 shows
the amount of science data generated by HST per month.
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Table 3 – Improvements in Key Observatory Performance Parameters 
 
Parameter Launch 
4/1990 
SM1 
12/1993 
SM2   
2/1997 
SM3A 
12/1999 
SM3B 
3/2002 
Data Storage (G bits) 3 No Change 12 21 No Change 
Processing Power (MIPS) .4 4.6 No Change 91 No Change 
Total Available Power (W) 2495 2495 2270 2150 2835 
Power Available to Sis (W) 1080 1190 1035 1000 1760 
Power Required by Sis (W) 500 465 690 655 1260 
Cryogenic Cooling None None Frozen 
nitrogen 
70K 
None Mechanical 
Cryocooler 
74K 
Peak Science Jitter (mas, 
60-second rms) due to all 
disturbances 
39 21 No Change No Change 14 
Quiescent Science Jitter 
(mas, 60-second rms) 
3 
30% of 
orbit 
time 
3 
35% of 
orbit time 
No Change No Change 3 
95% of 
orbit time 
Aft Shroud Heat Transport 
- Radiated 
531 466 566 No Change 695 
Aft Shroud Heat Transport 
- Conducted 
0 No Change No Change No Change 695 
 
    B. Science Data Production 
     Each servicing mission, except for the third or SM3A, has installed new instruments.  Successive instruments for 
HST were built for less than the proceeding generation. New instruments increased the observing capability by 
between one and two orders of magnitude across the entire spectrum.  The ACS installed on SM3B provided a ten-
fold increase in capability over its predecessor.  The ability to upgrade science instruments and data systems with 
developing technology has increased the science data volume by a factor of 33 since the early 1990s.  Figure 4 
shows the increase in science data returns over the first thirteen years of life of HST.  
 
Figure 4 - Science Data Production 
 
Figure 2-4: Science return from HST between 1990-2003 (from Dedalis [27])
Some important insights from the figure are:
• After each servicing mission, the amount of science data returned increases
dramatically. This is because the servicing missions restored HST to full health
(via maintenance) and increased the science return (via upgrades).
• By 1999, science operations were halted because four of six RSUs had failed.
If servicing were unavailable, HST would not have been repaired, the mission
would have ceased, and none of the science data from the year 2000 onwards
would have been collected.
The experience of HST has clearly demonstrated that servicing telescopes provided
enormous contributions to the scientific community. The benefit of servicing is no
longer a theoretical concept.
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2.5 Servicing Technology: The How of Servicing
Most spacecraft servicing research has been directed towards the technology of servic-
ing. This research has shown that, in order to render a spacecraft serviceable, various
requirements are imposed on the system. Satisfying these requirements takes time and
costs money. The following is a brief survey of current and planned servicing vehicles
and technology demonstrators, which will motivate some of these requirements.
2.5.1 Servicing Technology Testbeds
As of 2007, there are four major programs that are intended to develop and demon-
strate technologies that are required for spacecraft servicing.
1. ETS-7 (1997) was a Japanese testbed to demonstrate docking technologies. It
consisted of two spacecraft: a target and a chaser. The target was a cooperative
satellite, which means it maintained attitude control and had markers painted
on the satellite to aid the chaser in its approach. The chaser used a combination
of GPS and LIDAR to approach a target satellite from up to several kilometres
away, and optical sensors to detect the markers on the target for final docking
procedures within 2 metres. The test demonstrated technologies needed to
perform operations such as refuelling, structural deployment, and component
replacement. [30, 31, 32]
2. Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (2005), or
DART, was a NASA testbed for proximity algorithms and operations. The
DART spacecraft was to perform a sequence of manoeuvres around a pre-
deployed MUBLCOM satellite. MUBLCOM acted as the target and was equipped
with retroreflectors as navigation aids for the servicer. The mission was a par-
tial success, but the DART spacecraft inadvertently collided with the target
and ended the mission prematurely. [33, 34]
3. Orbital Express (2007) is a DARPA/Boeing spacecraft to test orbital servicing
technologies. The mission consists of two spacecraft: a servicer (ASTRO) and a
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target (NEXTSat). ASTRO is a servicing technology testbed, and NEXTSat is
a prototype for future serviceable spacecraft. The main servicing tasks that will
be tested include fuel replenishment and replacement of modularized spacecraft
components [34].
4. Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits (2010), or SUMO,
is a DARPA spacecraft that can dock with satellites without specialized mark-
ings or fixtures. It uses a large set of cameras to detect the target satellite
and uses multiple robotic arms to attach itself to launch fixture holes on the
target. SUMO is often called an “orbital tow truck”: it will dock with satellites
in GEO and provide sufficient delta-v to modify their orbits. SUMO operates
autonomously due to the large time delay between Earth and GEO, which pre-
cludes teleoperation of the precise, time-dependent motions that the spacecraft
is required to perform [35, 36].
2.5.2 Technical Requirements for Servicing
The programs described above have demonstrated that the target spacecraft have
several requirements placed on them in order to enable servicing, including:
• Failure Identification: The target spacecraft must be able to determine which
components failed, so that the servicer can repair all necessary components.
• Docking Mechanism: The target spacecraft must allow the servicer to dock with
it. Generally this is accomplished by attaching a docking interface to the target
spacecraft exterior.
• Docking Cooperation: The target spacecraft must be equipped with docking
aids to assist the servicer during proximity operations. Docking aids can either
be passive (retroreflectors, optical targets, etc) or active (sensors, beacons).
• Attitude Control : The target spacecraft must be stabilized prior to servicer
approach. Prior to servicing, the target can either fix its attitude relative to
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inertial space (as telescopes often do), or the target can control its attitude in
tandem with the approaching servicer spacecraft. If the target is free-floating
(which may occur as a result of a major systems failure), it is very difficult for
the servicer to dock, and the servicer would require very specialized equipment
to attempt docking.
• Accessibility : The target spacecraft must grant the servicer access to internal
systems. This may include ports for fuel and electrical power, as well as external
doors to provide access to internal components that will be repaired.
• Modularization: Replaceable components onboard the target must be designed
to be removeable by the servicer. Modular designs must consider the capabilities
of the system that perform the replacement, whether it is robotic or an astronaut
on EVA. Note that modularization may incur cost and mass penalties due to a
lower packing efficiency and an increased number of interfaces.
The lesson here is that servicing places major design requirements on a serviceable
spacecraft. Satisfying these requirements will incur additional mass and costs in the
design phase. If these costs cannot be justified, then program managers will drop
serviceability from the spacecraft design.
2.6 Previous Spacecraft Servicing Studies
Servicing operations are invariably expensive, so to be incorporated in future space
programs, servicing must be economically justified to program managers, particularly
when faced with budget and schedule pressures. Various studies have attempted to
analyze the economics of servicing. Reynerson [37] created a mathematical model
to analyze the value of servicing for a constellation of satellites. The constellation
includes multiple satellites in different orbits and planes, and it is serviced by a
reusable servicer spacecraft which transfers to the orbit of the satellite needing repair.
Servicing operations consist of replacing a percentage of the satellite mass, either by
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component replacement or by refuelling. When the servicer is not in use, it is parked
at an orbital servicing depot, which contains replacement units and extra fuel.
Reynerson uses the metric of lifecycle cost savings to determine whether or not
servicing is valuable for a particular combination of constellation and servicing ar-
chitectures. In the model, servicing operations can both increase and decrease the
lifecycle cost of the constellation. On the one hand, servicing extend the life of satel-
lites in the constellation. To maintain the constellation at full capacity, satellites that
fail must be replaced by spares launched from Earth, so over the life of the program,
if the satellites operate for longer, less spares must be sent into orbit. As less spares
are needed, the constellation lifecycle cost goes down. On the other hand, the de-
velopment and deployment of the servicing spacecraft and orbital depot themselves
incur additional costs. If the overall effect of these two cost drivers is to decrease the
lifecycle cost of the mission, then servicing is declared valuable.
This is a common approach used to analyze servicing, but it suffers from two
limitations. First, it does not account for any benefits associated with satellite up-
grades. The analysis implicitly assumes that servicing maintains the constellation
at its original capacity, with no regard for changes to the constellation that could
increase benefits. Indeed, Joppin notes that maintenance operations alone generally
cannot justify servicing programs [16]. Second, the approach explicitly requires the
cost of servicing to be modelled. Servicing technology, particularly robotic servicing,
is highly uncertain because it is still under development, so cost models of servicing
missions also have a high degree of uncertainty. Thus, if the value calculation uses
a servicing cost quantity, then the results are suspect. Modellers must aim to avoid
including the cost of servicing in order to decrease the uncertainty in the results.
2.7 Previous Telescope Servicing Studies
Most research on the value of servicing has been for programs with revenue-generating
satellites, since standard Net Present Value (NPV) calculations can be applied on
such programs. Space telescopes do not generate revenue, and as such there are fewer
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studies that have focussed on the value of telescope servicing. There have been a few
notable studies, which are described in this section.
2.7.1 To Service a Space Telescope
Joppin [17] developed a computer simulation to determine the change in telescope
science return over its lifetime with different types of servicing operations. Three
servicing types were considered:
• Repair any failed components,
• Upgrade bus instruments when new technology becomes available, and
• Upgrade the science instruments when new technology is available.
Joppin determined the increase in science return with combinations of the above tasks
as compared to a baseline case where the telescope receives no servicing.
The simulation captures the effect of both uncertainty and management decision-
making on science return. It incorporates four sources of uncertainty: failure time
of the telescope, failure of servicing mission, arrival time of new bus technology, and
arrival time of new science instrument technology. As well, the simulation captures
the actions of program managers through a decision model. The decision model
evaluates the program at discrete time steps and determines when servicing missions
are sent based on a set of pre-defined decision rules.
The result of the simulation was a set of probability distributions of the cumulative
science return of the telescope program for each servicing type. Figure 2-5 shows the
probability distribution for two cases. In both cases, the science return is normalized
to one, which corresponds to the return of a telescope with no servicing. Case (a) is
where servicing includes both repairs and upgrades, and the mean science return is
about 300 with a maximum return of 2100. Case (b) is where servicing includes repair
only (no upgrades), and the mean science return is about 5 and with a maximum
return of 14. Joppin concludes that servicing for the purposes of maintenance alone
45
Fig. 3 Decision model for the repair and upgrade of the spacecraft.
efficiency by a factor of 10. A maximum utility im-
provement of 2105 is achieved when a new instrument
appears every year for the first 4 years and the baseline
satellite fails during the first year of operation. The
scale is artificially large because of the utility metric
chosen and often we will consider the utility improve-
ment as a percentage of the utility that can be gained
in an ideal scenario that provides the maximum utility
improvement. The scale in Figure 4 has been rewrit-
ten in percentage of the ideal value, which is 2105 in
this case.
Impact of servicing risk on the utility distribution
The risk of catastrophic failure of a servicing mission
causes a major change of the mission utility distribu-
tion as illustrated in Figure 5. First, the mission utility
for a serviceable satellite can be lower than the base-
line utility because the mission may be lost during an
upgrade mission. Therefore, on the contrary to the
case of a servicing risk of 0%, the ratio of a service-
able satellite utility and a baseline satellite utility can
be lower than 1. A peak at low mission utility val-
ues appears corresponding to scenarios for which the
Fig. 4 Probability distribution of the improvement
in utility achieved with a serviceable satellite.
6 of 11
(a) Both repairs and upgrades during ser icing
Fig. 5 Probability distribution of the improve-
ment in utility achieved with a serviceable satellite
assuming a 10% servicing risk.
satellite is lost at some point in time during the time
horizon. The probability distribution is flattened over
the high utility values. For example, a 10% servicing
risk causes the probability of multiplying the baseline
utility by 500 to decrease from 4% to 2.5%.
Repair missions
The Hubble Space Telescope has been designed to
be regularly serviced by the Shuttle. The reliability of
the satellite drops below 50% after four years of opera-
tion if no repair is undergone. The implications of the
design choices made for the Hubble Space Telescope
and the value of the opportunity to repair are studied.
Impact of satellite failure on the baseline architecture
The utility distribution for a baseline satellite that
cannot be repaired is shown in Figure 6. It can be seen
that the mean time for a satellite failure is 3.5 years,
which means that because of the choices in the design
of the Hubble Space Telescope, a repair mission must
be carried out on average every 3.5 years to maintain
the scientific platform. Each peak in the distribution
corresponds to one additional year of operation of the
satellite. In all the scenarios tested, the satellite never
survives more than 8 years.
Using on-orbit servicing for satellite repair
The value of repairing the satellite (on-demand and
scheduled repairs) can be investigated independently
from the upgrade option. The mission utility distri-
bution for a serviceable satellite is shown in Figure 7,
assuming that the satellite is always repaired but never
upgraded. The distribution is discontinuous, with each
peak corresponding to a different time at which the
satellite first fails. On average, the utility gained over
the mission is almost multiplied by 5 when the satellite
is regularly repaired. It can be noted that repairing the
satellite always increases the mission utility compared
Fig. 6 Probability distribution of the mission util-
ity achieved with a non serviceable satellite. The
probability of failure of the spacecraft is derived
from the reliability of the Hubble Space Telescope.
Fig. 7 Probability distribution of the improvement
in utility offered by the option to repair. The prob-
ability of failure of the spacecraft is derived from
the reliability of the Hubble Space Telescope.
to the baseline case because the satellite never survives
the 15-year lifetime based on the design choices made
if no repair mission is launched.
Impact of servicing risk on the option to repair
The same results are presented when a 10% risk of
catastrophic failure during a repair mission is assumed.
The distribution of mission utility is shown in Figure
8. The utility generated over the satellite lifetime is
on average four times higher than the baseline utility.
However, it must be noted that there is a probability of
about 8% to get a utility lower than without repairing
the satellite. An average of 3.4 repair missions are
carried out corresponding to an average mission cost
of $2.3 billion.
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(b) Only repairs during servicing
Figure 2-5: Probability distributions of telescope science return (from Joppin [17])
probably does not justify the costs, but servicing to upgrade bus and/or science
components provides enormous benefits.
The simulation uses an aggregate reliability curve to provide the probability of
operation in the future. Figure 2-6 shows the reliability curve through time, where
each data point (t, p) represents the probability p that the telescope will be functional
at t years into the future. This reliability data is a first-order approximation of
the behaviour of the telescope. An improvement would be to model the individual
components. This would make the simulation much more realistic, and engineers
could use the simulation to determine the effect of either changing the number of
components on the telescope or the design life of each component.
The simulation is a solid foundation for analyzing the benefits of servicing, but it is
less useful for aiding decision-making. The simulation has demonstrated that servicing
increases both the science return and lifecycle cost of the telescope. This result can
be summarized as “if you spend more, you can get more science”, which was already
known intuitively. Although this result is true, this does not help program managers
make decisions. Specifically, managers still have to justify increased spending to
enable servicing, and the simulation does not avoid the problem where serviceability
is dropped due to budgetary pressures. The difference is that managers now are armed
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Figure 2-6: Aggregate HST reliability curve (from Joppin [17])
with concrete, quantitative data to demonstrate the benefits of servicing, which can
aid in persuading others to keep serviceability in a telescope design. For this reason,
Joppin’s work is a significant contribution to the understanding of telescope servicing
value. This thesis aims to build on her work.
2.7.2 The SAFIR Experience
The Single Aperture Far Infrared (SAFIR) spacecraft is a future telescope where
engineers are currently investigating the potential to include servicing. SAFIR will
operate at the Earth-Sun L2 Lagrange point and its design features a deployable sun-
shield to keep the optical telescope assembly (OTA) at extremely cold temperatures
(4-7 K) in order to observe light in the mid- to far-infrared spectrum (30-800 µm) [38].
Moe [39] and Lester [40] have identified many potential areas where servicing could
provide benefits to the telescope program. A summary of these benefits is shown in
Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Identified Benefits of SAFIR Servicing (from Lester [40])
Service Function Example Comments 
Replace ACS 
hardware 
Attitude control hardware, such as 
gyros or computers. 
As for HST. 
Replace cryo fluids Liquid helium, cooling line fluids Although cryo fluids are not now baselined, the ability to replace 
them and extend mission life could be considered. 
Replace cryocoolers ACTDP-type cryocoolers now 
baselined for SAFIR. 
While instrument cryocoolers (e.g. CADRs) could be packaged 
with the instrument, observatory cryocoolers need larger scale 
plumbing connections. 
Replace solar panels Deployable rigid panels, baseline 
InGaP/GaAs/Ge or thinned Si 
New technology, as well as replacement of UV-degraded panels. 
As for HST. 
Replace sunshade Baseline aluminized Kapton, deploy 
after attachment 
Replacement of UV and micrometeorite degraded panels. Tears, 
holes, etc. 
Replace/Upgrade 
science instruments 
Science or wavefront sensing 
components 
Respond to technology advances in sensors and optical design 
and aging of the original components. 
Replace Propellants  Fluid propellants used for orbit 
maintenance 
In-space fluid transfer technology now being tested (e.g. Orbital 
Express). Could also just replace entire thrusters instead. 
Inspection Small cameras orbit the observatory 
and provide imagery 
Loose shielding, tiedowns, etc.  
Diagnosis  Retrieve sampling coupons placed on 
the observatory for analysis 
Info for next servicing mission. Engineering lessons on 
contamination. 
Replace optical 
components 
Damaged mirror or mirror coating 
could necessitate replacement of a 
mirror segment 
In-space optical recoating should be considered as an advanced 
alternative capability 
Replace comm. Tx/Rx 
systems  
Ka band  w/directional antenna is 
baselined 
Bandwidth upgrades as necessary to match larger sensor formats. 
Replace batteries Baseline Li-Ion As for HST. Batteries used for safemode only in SAFIR 
Mission planners have investigated several potential SAFIR servicing strategies.
Since SAFIR will be parked at the Earth-Sun L2 point, it is unlikely to return to LEO
for servicing, due to the large delta-v requirement of 3.5 km/s [40]. There are two
primary candidate servicing architectures that have been identified [7]. First, SAFIR
can be serviced robotically in-situ. This has the advantage of not losing observation
time during transit. Second, SAFIR can be transferred to the Earth-Moon L1 point
and be serviced either by robots or astronauts. This has the advantage of being closer
to Earth, and thus more accessible. With these two strategies, researchers analyzed
the engineering design requirements imposed on SAFIR in order to enable servicing.
The primary challenges relate to the protection of delicate components such as the
sunshields and the cryogenically cooled OTA, as well as the thermal and mechanical
interfaces between the servicer and the telescope while docked [39].
As many studies have done in the past, this research into SAFIR servicing has
focussed on the benefits associated with servicing without determining whether the
costs associated with those benefits could be justified. The example shown earlier
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in Figure 2-2 comes from a presentation on the value of SAFIR servicing, but they
made the common mistake of focussing on benefits instead of value. For example, if
servicing SAFIR will cost many billions of dollars, it is unlikely to be of any value,
since replacement (launch of a completely new SAFIR) may be a more cost-effective
option. Clearly a more comprehensive analysis, which takes into account both costs
and benefits, is needed to evaluate whether or not to plan for servicing operations on
SAFIR and modify the telescope design.
2.8 The Research Gap
This chapter has summarized the current state of research in the field of telescope ser-
vicing, both in the technical methodology (the how) and the economic considerations
(the why). As discussed in Chapter 1, the goal of this thesis is to develop a framework
to analyze the value of including serviceability in a telescope design. Many of the
elements necessary to conduct this analysis are scattered throughout the literature,
and this chapter has highlighted some specific areas that must be addressed to con-
struct the framework. These areas can be summarized in three Research Questions
that will be the focus of the remainder of this thesis.
First, it is clear that servicing can provide considerable benefits to a telescope
program by maintenance, life extension, and increased science performance. It is also
clear that in order to enable telescope servicing, costs are incurred both during the
design and operations phase. Both benefits and costs of servicing must be analyzed
in order to decide whether or not to incorporate servicing into a new telescope design.
The difficulty comes from the fact that the benefits are not measured in the same
units as dollars, and this difficulty has stymied efforts to properly determine the value
of incorporating servicing of space missions.
Research Question 1
How can the costs and benefits of telescope servicing be compared to
determine the value of serviceability?
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Second, most research into servicing has focussed on the technology, or how to
service, and comparatively little research has investigated the value, or why to service.
No study thus far has taken a comprehensive look at how to justify the incorporation
of serviceability in a telescope design. Designers and program managers are thus
incapable of quantitatively determining the value of serviceability, which in turn has
led to serviceability not being incorporated into many missions.
Research Question 2
How can the incorporation of serviceability in a telescope be justified?
Finally, the value of servicing comes from the flexibility to perform beneficial
actions in the future, as uncertainty is resolved. This can be done either by protect-
ing against losses or taking advantage of advances on the ground. Special analysis
techniques are needed in order to accurately account for the value of this flexibility.
Research Question 3
How can the value of flexibility provided by servicing be analyzed?
The next chapter will discuss general principles that can address these research
questions and will be incorporated into the framework.
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Chapter 3
Addressing the Gap:
Framework Principles
The previous chapter discussed the current state of research into spacecraft and tele-
scope servicing and motivated several research questions to be addressed. In order to
develop a framework to analyze the value of serviceability, some basic principles are
needed to answer these questions. These principles will be discussed in this chapter,
and are summarized below.
• The costs and benefits of servicing will be separated.
• The value of serviceability will be analyzed by comparing a telescope servicing
program to a telescope replacement program.
• The value of flexibility will be incorporated by employing decision rule analysis
and Monte-Carlo simulation.
3.1 Separating Costs and Benefits of Servicing
The standard method used to determine the value of serviceability in a space pro-
gram is to calculate the cost savings that would result from incorporating servicing
into the program [41]. There are many ways that servicing can decrease the cost of a
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space program. For instance, components installed on a serviceable spacecraft can be
designed for a shorter life, since servicing provides the opportunity to replace failed
components through maintenance. Components with shorter design lifetimes have
lower costs than those with longer lifetimes [42]. Alternatively, the amount of redun-
dancy built into a serviceable spacecraft can be decreased, since fewer backups would
be needed on the spacecraft [43]. The cost savings can be computed by comparing the
lifecycle cost of a program without servicing to the lifecycle cost of a similar program
that uses servicing. Several studies have demonstrated that programs can achieve
significant cost savings through the use of servicing [37, 43, 44].
The difficulty with this approach is that the cost models for servicer spacecraft
are highly uncertain. As described in Section 2.5, there have been many testbeds for
robotic servicers, but they are still under development. To estimate the cost of these
spacecraft, some researchers have used cost-estimating relationships based on histori-
cal spacecraft [45]. Unfortunately, servicers are very different than most satellites, so
these relationships are not readily applicable. The few cost models that were made
specifically for servicers have large error bounds on their cost estimates. As a result,
the cost savings incurred through servicing are often less than this uncertainty, as
illustrated in Figure 3-1 [44]. Therefore, any analysis that directly use servicer cost
models produce results that are often inconclusive.
Program cost without serviceability
Program cost with serviceability
Lifecycle
Cost ($M)
Maximum Price for Servicing
Cost of Servicing Cost Uncertainty
Program cost without serviceability
Program cost with serviceability
Lifecycle
Cost ($M)
Figure 3-1: Cost savings with highly uncertain servicing costs
Notwithstanding these issues, Saleh [43] noted that if servicing missions were free,
a program that used servicing would realize significant cost savings. These savings
would not have high uncertainty because they do not include any highly uncertain
cost models. His strategy was to exclude the cost of servicing from the overall lifecycle
cost of the program. Then, the gap between the cost of the program with and without
52
servicing represents the maximum price that one is willing to pay in order to perform
servicing missions, as illustrated in Figure 3-2. Saleh calls this the customer-centric
approach. Rather than calculating the cost of the servicing mission (which is the cost
from the servicing provider), the focus is shifted to how much cost the customer, or
the organization that purchases servicing, is willing to tolerate in order to perform
servicing missions.
Program cost without serviceability
Program cost with serviceability
Lifecycle
Cost ($M)
Maximum Price for Servicing
Cost f Servicing Cost Uncertainty
Program cost without serviceability
Program cost with serviceability
Lifecycle
Cost ($M)
Figure 3-2: Cost savings as the maximum price of servicing
This maximum price can be compared to the quoted price of a servicing mission
from a contractor. Consider the perspective of a telescope developer such as NASA,
which acts as a customer for servicing. If the quoted price is less than the maximum
price, then servicing is valuable to NASA: the servicing missions can be purchased
within budget, so the telescope should be designed with serviceability to take advan-
tage of the benefits of servicing. If the quoted price is higher than the maximum
price, then either the serviceability is not valuable (because NASA would be unable
to pay for servicing missions, so there’s no point in adding serviceability), or the
budget should be increased to pay for the missions. In the latter case, the framework
provides NASA data on how much the budget should be increased, and what the
expected science return is in exchange for the budget increase.
There are three main advantages of separating the servicing cost from the rest of
the lifecycle costs of the spacecraft. First, as discussed earlier, excluding servicing
costs dramatically reduces the level of uncertainty in the overall estimate of lifecycle
cost. Second, the maximum servicing price calculated by this method is independent
of the servicing architecture. The price is valid for whichever servicing type is avail-
able, whether human or robotic [45]. Third, it provides quantitative information to
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decision makers on how much money should be spent on servicing. This will help jus-
tify the additional cost of serviceability in telescopes, which will make it more likely
that serviceability will be retained in the face of budgetary pressures.
3.2 Using Program Comparison to Calculate Value
The method described above requires a telescope program without servicing against
which the servicing program will be compared. One possibility is a program with a
telescope designed to last for the entire nominal mission duration. While this may be
possible for space programs with shorter lifetimes and less complexity, for large space
telescopes with long mission durations of 20 years or more (such as HST), it is often
infeasible to design a telescope to operate for that duration without intervention.
The feasible alternative to servicing a spacecraft is to replace the spacecraft with
a new copy when the initial spacecraft fails. This was contemplated for the Solar
Maximum Mission (SMM), which was launched in 1980 for a two-year mission [46].
Midway through its life, the pointing system onboard SMM failed prematurely, pre-
venting it from accurately pointing towards the Sun. NASA had two options: replace
the spacecraft or service it via the Shuttle, and found that the cost of servicing would
be 25% that of replacement [45]. NASA decided to send the Space Shuttle Challenger
on a mission to service SMM. In the end, servicing prolonged the life of SMM and
enabled it to operate until December 1989 [46].
3.2.1 Comparison Cases
This framework evaluates programs with servicing and replacement as two separate
cases, which are strategies employed in programs to ensure the telescope is operational
throughout its nominal mission duration. The two cases in the framework are:
1. Replacement case
2. Servicing case
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The Replacement case involves two identical telescopes over the program lifetime.
At the start of the program, the first telescope is launched and operates until com-
ponent failures cause it to become inoperative. When this occurs, a second telescope
is constructed and launched. This telescope is based on the original design, so no
development costs are incurred, and the cost of the second telescope is solely the cost
of construction. The telescope is identical except for the science instrument, which is
upgraded with the newest technology.
In contrast, the Servicing case involves a single telescope that would operate
throughout the entire program lifetime. The telescope would be periodically ser-
viced to keep the bus components operational and install new science instruments
with the latest technology to increase the telescope science return. In order to allow
servicing to take place, the telescope must be designed with serviceability. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.5, these modifications will increase the initial cost of the telescope,
but servicing will preclude the need for a second copy of the telescope to be launched.
The major cost tradeoff is between building two telescopes (Replacement case) versus
building a serviceable telescope and paying for servicing missions (Servicing case).
Within these two cases, there are several ways that program managers could
incorporate replacement or servicing missions into the program, called subcases. The
two subcases, applicable for both the Replacement and Servicing cases, are:
1. As-Needed subcase
2. Fixed Schedule subcase
In the Fixed-Schedule subcase, missions are executed at predetermined times
throughout the mission life. The advantage of a fixed schedule is that the program
can get regular updates and ensure that any problems on the telescopes are fixed or
mitigated before they cause failures1. In contrast, in the As-Needed case, missions are
executed only when the telescope fails or is near failure. The advantage of sending
missions only as needed is that they can be delayed as long as possible, which provides
1From a programmatic standpoint, a fixed schedule for replacements or servicing missions may
also be easier to budget for. This is not included in the analysis
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Servicing CaseReplacement Case
Upon failure…
…repair the telescope and 
install upgraded science 
instruments
Upon failure…
…construct and launch a
replacement with newest 
science instruments
Serviceable
Replace
telescope at a
pre-specified time
Fixed-Schedule As-Needed
Service
telescope at pre-
specified times
Fixed-Schedule
Service telescope
when operations
are suspended
 
As-Needed
Replace telescope
when the first one 
stops operations
New
Figure 3-3: Summary of cases and subcases in the framework
two benefits. First, since telescope instrument technology rapidly progresses, servic-
ing or replacing the telescope later in its life will result in a more powerful science
instrument being used. Second, delaying missions will ensure that the telescope is
not attended to unnecessarily. Since both replacement and servicing are invariably
expensive, program managers want to ensure that sending the mission was worthwhile
based on the state of the telescope. For example it would be unacceptable to send
a mission only to repair one defective gyroscope; rather, the mission should be sent
only when the telescope needs significant maintenance. The cases and subcases in
the framework are illustrated in Figure 3-3.
Note that the Fixed-Schedule Replacement subcase has the opportunity to have
two telescope operating at the same time. If the replacement telescope is launched
before the initial telescope has failed, then both will operate until the initial telescope
fails. The framework allows for two telescopes to operate simultaneously, and the
benefits and costs of both telescopes are counted.
The comparison method as described above has one primary limitation: there is
no do-nothing option. There is no way the analysis would come to the conclusion
that neither replacement nor servicing should be implemented. The analysis is set
up to calculate the value of servicing as compared to the baseline Replacement case.
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The only conclusions one could draw would be one of the following:
1. There is sufficient budget to pay for servicing missions, so incorporate service-
ability into the telescope design.
2. There is insufficient budget to pay for servicing missions, so the telescope will
be replaced instead. Do not incorporate serviceability into the design.
This assumption exists because there was insufficient data to analyze the case
where there is a single telescope that operates for the entire, extended mission du-
ration. Indeed, as of 2007 no telescope has operated in space for decades without
intervention. Nevertheless, this limited scope can provide important insights into the
value of serviceability and how to proceed to determine its value.
3.2.2 Comparison Parameters
To properly compare programs, the comparison method must have three properties.
First, the comparison must be made on a common baseline2. If one compares two
programs that are not equal on some level, then the comparison itself is meaningless.
For example, comparing the costs and benefits of a short-duration Earth observation
program and a long-duration infrared telescope program cannot produce meaningful
results. Second, the comparison must use a metric that can be used to discriminate
between programs. This means the metric must be applicable to the program under
analysis: it is not useful to use number of images as a metric if the programs produce
spectra rather than images. Finally, the metric must have a sense of direction; that
is, more attractive programs are defined by either higher or lower metric values.
One possible method to compare telescope programs is to minimize the lifecycle
cost for a given science return. This is often the case for scientific space missions with
a well-defined, quantifiable science objective. For example, the goal of the Terrestrial
Planet Finder (TPF) project was to observe a minimum number of solar systems
to attempt to detect extrasolar planets3, and to observe certain properties for each
2This is colloquially referred to as comparing “apples to apples”
3Extrasolar planets are planets outside our own solar system
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detected planet [47]. This science objective is a definitive goal, and when the goal
is met, the mission could be called a success. TPF could be certified as successful
once the spacecraft has succeeded in studying the required number of systems and
has taken the required data for each system. Furthermore, this science objective
is one that can be designed towards. Engineers designing the spacecraft can tailor
the amount of consumables and expected life of components so that the system can
meet the objective with a high degree of certainty. In the design phase, different
architectures are compared based on their ability to meet the science objective, and
the best architecture is the one that can meet the objective for the least cost.
This comparison method is not appropriate for general space telescopes since they
do not have set science objectives that must be reached to define success. Both space
and ground observatories exist to provide a platform for astronomers to continually
gather information for a wide variety of studies. There is no quantifiable point at
which a telescope is considered successful. Indeed, scientists define a successful tele-
scope as one that has contributed (and continues to contribute) towards a body of
research. The appropriate metric for the telescope is science return, where a better
telescope provides more science return over its life.
For defined-science missions such as TPF, the goal was to minimize the cost re-
quired to achieve a set amount of science return over the mission. For a general space
telescope, a more appropriate goal is the converse; namely, maximize the science re-
turn for a fixed lifecycle cost. This is reasonable because space telescope programs
are often subject to cost constraints rather than fixed science return. As well, a fixed
nominal mission duration is an important baseline quantity. Astronomers want to
be assured that they will have an operational space observatory for at least a set
amount of time. As well, telescope program planners (such as NASA) want to know
the lifetime of a telescope in order to fit it into a larger observation program.
In summary, this framework will compare the cases and subcases based on the
amount of science return produced, where more science return is better. The baseline
for comparison is fixed lifecycle cost, which comes from the Replacement case, and
nominal mission duration, which is a specified parameter.
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3.3 Incorporating Flexibility and Decision-Making
Section 2.3 described how the value of servicing comes from the flexibility to react
to uncertain events in the future. Servicing provides the ability to make decisions
as this uncertainty is resolved [45]. Standard economic evaluation techniques such
as NPV cannot capture this flexibility, so an alternative modelling method is needed
to incorporate decision making into the value analysis. There are several potential
methods available that are currently used in industry and literature. This section will
discuss each of these in turn.
3.3.1 Methods from Financial Options
Subsection 2.2.3 demonstrated that serviceability can be considered as a real option
in a space telescope. Real options are closely tied to their analogues in the financial
world, where elaborate theories have been developed to determine the appropriate
price of a financial option. Can these financial analysis techniques be used to evaluate
the real option of spacecraft servicing?
The fundamental theory of options pricing is the Black-Scholes model, initially
proposed by Merton in 1973. The theory considers the performance of an underlying
asset by assuming the price follows random Brownian motion with a known volatility
σ, where volatility is defined by the variance in the asset price [12]. The model con-
sists of a set of partial differential equations whose solution under various conditions
represents the value of an option. The option value represents the maximum price
that one should be willing to pay to purchase the option; otherwise the expected
return would be insufficient to recover your costs. A more complete treatment of the
Black-Scholes model is provided by de Neufville [11] and Trigeorgis [12].
There are two primary difficulties in trying to apply financial option pricing tech-
niques to the spacecraft servicing. First, the model assumes that the benefits of the
option are monetary, since the theory is designed to analyze financial instruments such
as stocks and bonds. It is therefore difficult to apply the techniques to the real option
of space telescope serviceability since the benefits are non-monetary. Second, and
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more fundamentally, many options pricing techniques (including the Black-Scholes
model) rely on the existence of a replicating portfolio. A replicating portfolio is a
set of assets whose value tracks the value of the option [12]. Selecting the replicating
portfolio for financial options is straightforward: it consists of the financial instrument
for which the option was purchased. For real options, there may be no underlying
asset that is appropriate. In the case of a space telescope program, which is run by a
university or government agency and produces science data, there is no conceivable
financial asset whose value rises as the science return from the telescope increases.
Thus financial options theory, although attractive and mathematically rigorous, is
not appropriate for analyzing servicing as a real option.
3.3.2 Decision Tree Analysis
Another method that can be used to analyze the value of servicing is decision tree
analysis. A decision tree is a sequence of decisions at discrete points through time
called decision nodes. Between each decision node is a chance node, which is where
uncertain events may occur. The decisions are not made at the start of the program;
rather, they are made as time progresses and uncertainty is resolved [45]. Each
decision and chance node pair represents one time step. For example, if a decision
tree had a time step of one year, then a decision node represents choices that could
be made at year one of a project, and the chance node captures all random events
that can occur within one year of the decision. From each node, branches extend
forward that represent different paths the system can take, whether they occur due
to decisions or random events. A sample decision tree is shown in Figure 3-4.
At each decision node, managers must choose which decision to make, and the
choice is determined by which decision will maximize the expected value of the node.
The expected value of a decision node at time step n is the weighted sum of the
expected values of each of the downstream decision nodes at time step (n+1), weighted
by the probabilities of the chance events. In this way, the analysis of the decision
tree is recursive, and an optimum path can be found to maximize the expected value
at the start of the project. The net result of a decision tree analysis is the overall
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Figure 3-4: Structure of a decision tree
NPV of the project and the optimum set of choices that should be taken in order to
achieve this value.
The difficulty with decision trees is that they can become prohibitively large when
there are many potential chance events and/or decisions that can be made. The
number of nodes in a decision tree is exponential in the number of time steps, decision
branches, and chance branches, so even a small number of branches at each node
can result in a very large tree [48]. This becomes an issue with space telescopes,
since there are a large number of branches from each chance node. Telescopes have
many components onboard, and each has a probability of failure, so there are many
combinations of random events that can occur, resulting in many chance branches.
Evaluating such a tree becomes very computationally expensive.
3.3.3 Decision Rules and Monte-Carlo Simulation
To avoid the computational complexity of analyzing a large decision tree, the system
under investigation can be simulated through time. The simulation discretizes the
program lifetime into time steps, and at each time step, the set of chance events are
evaluated. Effectively, the simulation “rolls the dice” to determine the outcomes of
chance events at every step. The difference is how decisions are made. Whereas a
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Figure 3-5: Steps in a decision rule analysis
decision tree analysis computes the optimal strategy to determine each decision, the
simulation makes decisions on the fly based on a set of pre-defined decision rules.
These are if/else stat ments that are evaluated at dis rete times to d termine which
choice to make. Decision rules are often formulated as thresholds that must be met
in order for an action to be taken. The system being simulated is represented by a
state, which captures the effect of random events and decisions during the simulation.
This state may change based on probabilistic events and decision-making. When the
program terminates, the simulation calculates the net result of all the decisions made
and the states that the system passed through.
Each time step in the simulation has four stages, as shown in Figure 3-5.
1. All chance events are evaluated to determine their result.
2. The system state is updated to reflect these chance events.
3. Based on the current system state, the decision rules are evaluated to determine
the actions to be taken.
4. The system state is updated to reflect the actions performed.
The simulation moves on to the next time step, where these four stages are repeated.
This continues until the system reaches the end of its lifetime, at which point the
simulation terminates.
The simulation can be demonstrated through a simple thought experiment. Con-
sider a factory that has an option to expand capacity if demand increases. The state
associated with the factory is its capacity and its production rate. The production
rate is subject to random failure events, and the market demand is probabilistic. A
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possible decision rule is to increase capacity if demand increases by 200% above the
initial demand. Each time step in the simulation would progress through the four
stages as follows:
1. Determine the current market demand and if any failures occured in the plant.
2. Update the system state (production rate) if these failures occur.
3. Evaluate the decision rule: has the demand increased sufficiently to warrant a
factory expansion?
4. Update the system state (capacity) if the option to expand is exercised.
The result of the simulation is dependent on the sequence of events that occurred
during the simulation. In other words, the result is specific to the particular set of
dice rolls that happened during the simulation. To obtain a more general sense of
the option value, the simulation must be repeated many times in order to remove the
dependence on particular events. This method is called Monte-Carlo analysis [49].
It was named after the famous casino in Monte Carlo because the analysis could be
thought of as a long series of dice rolls. The number of iterations that is required in
a Monte-Carlo simulation depends on the amount of elements in the system that are
subject to uncertainty. With more uncertain elements, more iterations are required
to average out the effects of each of these elements.
After running the simulation many times, properties of the system can be de-
scribed as a probability distribution. The probability distribution can be visualized
using a histogram, an example of which is shown in Figure 3-6. The histogram divides
the results for each property into bins, and provides the probability that the prop-
erty value falls within each bin. A histogram constructed in this manner is strictly
speaking a probability mass function (pmf) [50], but in this thesis it is called a prob-
ability distribution. An example is shown in Figure 3-6. The third bar from the left
signifies there is a 30% chance that the parameter falls between 20 and 30, and the
probabilities of all bars add up to 100%. The dashed line denotes the mean value.
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Figure 3-6: An example probability distribution displayed as a histogram
3.4 Principles Summary
This chapter has discussed how the three research questions in Chapter 2 can be
addressed by three main principles. From these principles came six major ideas:
• To avoid the issue of uncertainty in servicing cost models, the cost of servicing
missions is excluded from the lifecycle cost of a telescope program.
• The value of servicing is the maximum price that the customer is willing to pay
in order to perform servicing missions.
• The servicing program is compared to a program where the telescope is replaced
with a copy of the original design.
• The comparison is made on the common baseline of fixed lifecycle cost and fixed
nominal mission duration.
• The metric for comparison is science return, where more science is better.
• The value of flexibility will be included by using decision rule analysis and
Monte-Carlo simulation.
The next chapter will discuss how these ideas will be incorporated into a simulation
framework to determine the value of telescope serviceability.
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Chapter 4
Raising the Scaffolding:
Framework Construction
The previous chapter detailed the principles that will be used in the framework to
resolve some of the major issues surrounding the evaluation of telescope servicing.
With these principles established, this chapter will detail the construction of the
framework itself.
The framework consists of five models that capture important aspects of the tele-
scope program. Each model addresses a necessary element that must be included
when calculating the value of servicing.
• Benefit Model : Determines the science return of the telescope through time.
• Cost Model : Determines the total lifecycle cost of the program.
• Telescope Model : Represents the telescope as an simplified set of components
that can fail and are affected by servicing and replacement operations.
• Stochastic Model : Evaluates uncertain quantities in other models, such as failure
times and risk probabilities.
• Decision Analysis Model : Simulates the decision-making of a program manager
regarding when to send a servicing or replacement mission.
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This framework provides the basis for creating a computer simulation of a tele-
scope program; that is, a simulation is the framework implemented using numerical
models. When this framework is used during an actual design project, each of these
five models would be implemented using code that captures design information and
company-specific knowledge held by the organization that is considering telescope
servicing. This chapter will discuss MATLAB functions for each of these five models
to demonstrate how the framework can be implemented as a simulation. It is impor-
tant to remember that the emphasis in this chapter is placed on the framework itself,
not on the simulation code used to implement the framework. Chapter 5 will use the
simulation in a case study to illustrate how the framework can analyze the value of
serviceability.
To avoid confusion, consistent terminology is used in this section to describe var-
ious parts of the simulation. A model is an individual module that models a distinct
process, such as a cost source or failure occurrence. The collection of models that
are used together to calculate the value of servicing is the simulation. One iteration
of the simulation is a run, and the set of runs that is used for analysis is called the
simulation results.
4.1 Measuring Benefits: Telescope Science Return
One of the primary benefits of servicing is the ability to install new instruments and
thus increase the science return of the telescope. To capture this phenomenon, the
framework requires a quantitative metric to measure telescope science return, and a
method to model the changes of the science return through time. There are three
metrics that are widely used in the telescope community to measure science return:
productivity rate, number of papers generated, and discovery efficiency. Each of
these three metrics is investigated below, with the aim of determining which is most
appropriate for use in the framework.
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4.1.1 Productivity Rate
The simplest metric to measure the science return of a telescope is the productivity
rate, which is the number of images captured by the telescope per unit time period.
The overall science return from the telescope is therefore the integral of the produc-
tivity rate over the life of the telescope [51]. The advantage of using productivity rate
is its simplicity. It is relatively straightforward to determine the amount of images
that can be captured by the telescope based on its design. Furthermore, the produc-
tivity rate is affected by the health of the telescope: if operations are affected due
to failures or wearout, the number of images that can be taken over a given period
decreases, which decreases the productivity rate.
However, there are two primary disadvantages to this metric. First, the produc-
tivity rate has no sense of the quality or worth of each image. There is an implicit
assumption that an image gives the same amount of information, whereas image data
has properties such as sensitivity, pixel size, field of view, etc., which are not cap-
tured with this simplistic approach. If the science instruments onboard are upgraded
via servicing, these parameters would change but the metric would remain the same.
Second, the metric is not applicable for instruments other than cameras because it
measures the rate of capture of discrete images. Instruments such as photometers and
spectrometers, which are commonly installed on space telescopes, do not capture dis-
crete images; instead, they collect data on intensity of light at particular wavelengths,
which cannot be easily converted into an analogue of a discrete image.
4.1.2 Number of Papers
Astronomers may argue that the science generated by a telescope is not necessarily
the raw data that is observed; rather, it is the scientific papers that are written based
on that data. Accordingly, a metric commonly used by scientists to evaluate telescope
programs is the number of papers. The number of papers resulting from a telescope
can be counted in a variety of ways.
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• Number of papers published in refereed journals (as shown in Figure 4-1)
• Number of papers presented at conferences
• Number of citations to a data set generated by a telescope
• Number of high-impact papers, defined as papers that are among the 200 most
cited refereed papers in the field [52].
HST SCIENCE METRICS 791
2004 PASP, 116:790–796
Fig. 1.—Numbers of refereed papers based on HST data as a function of
the year of publication.
are included. We take into account papers using archival data
either for reanalysis or for new scientific aims. This broad
definition has also been adopted by other observatories (e.g.,
ESO), but it has to be clearly stated if the numbers are to be
used for comparisons among different facilities, which is not
our aim in this paper.
Most of the information we use comes directly from ADS,
the NASA Astrophysics Data System hosted in Cambridge,
MA, at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics (see
Kurtz et al. 2000).
We run a boolean logic query on ADS with the following
search string: “HST OR (HUBBLE AND SPACE AND TELE-
SCOPE) OR WFPC OR WFPC1 OR WFPC2 OR (WF AND
PC AND HST) OR (WIDE AND FIELD AND PLANETARY
AND CAMERA) OR FGS OR (FINE AND GUIDANCE AND
SENSORS) OR HSP OR (HIGH AND SPEED AND PHO-
TOMETER) OR FOC OR (FAINT AND OBJECT AND CAM-
ERA) OR FOS OR (FAINT AND OBJECT AND SPECTRO-
GRAPH) OR HRS OR GHRS OR (GODDARD AND HIGH
AND RESOLUTION AND SPECTROGRAPH) OR STIS OR
(SPACE AND TELESCOPE AND IMAGING AND SPEC-
TROGRAPH) OR NICMOS OR (NEAR AND INFRARED
AND CAMERA AND MULTI AND OBJECT AND SPEC-
TROMETER) OR ACS OR (ADVANCED AND CAMERA
AND SURVEYS).”
The above query produces a list of papers, with some wrong
hits (HST also stands for Hawaiian Standard Time!). Each
paper is then downloaded and read in order to confirm whether
it is a genuine HST paper. Since ADS allows queries of only
the abstract of a paper and not its full text, hard copies of all
refereed journals are searched manually by the staff of the
STScI Library.
For each identified HST paper, we search for the program(s)
ID(s) of the HST data used. A link is then established in the
Multimission Archive at Space Telescope (MAST) between the
paper and the program(s). There is at least one program ID for
each HST paper. For each HST program, the list of publications
that it has generated is accessible online to the astronomical
community through the MAST Web site2 by entering the pro-
posal program ID.
Our list of papers that are recognized as using HST data is
publicly available online and can be accessed by the astronom-
ical community through ADS3 by activating the HST filter at
the “Select References In:” option. MAST automatically sends
a montly electronic update of the list of publications to ADS.
It is worth mentioning that the amount of work required to
identify a paper and link it to a program is sometimes very
onerous. We have encountered many stumbling blocks, often
created when authors provide the wrong program IDs. We have
even identified a few papers that wrongly claimed to be based
on HST data.
In order to test the completeness of our list of refereed papers,
we contacted all of the principal investigators (PIs) of programs
in Cycles 4 and 5 for which we could not find any refereed
publications arising from their data, and the PIs confirmed that
there were no additional papers. We expect that a few papers
may have been missed by our search, but the number must be
very small, certainly less than a few percent.
3. PAPER AND CITATION COUNTS METRICS
Most of the HST refereed papers (about 90%) are published
in the five major refereed journals: the Astrophysical Journal
(ApJ), the Astronomical Journal (AJ), Astronomy and Astro-
physics (A&A), the Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical
Society (MNRAS), and the Publications of the Astronomical
Society of the Pacific (PASP). Of course we also count all
papers in the other refereed journals, such as Nature and Sci-
ence. In this paper, we take into account only refereed
publications published by the end of 2003 December.
3.1. Paper Counts per Year
The number of refereed papers based on HST data is given
in Figure 1 as a function of the year of publication. Hubble is
an extremely productive telescope: between its launch in 1990
April and the end of 2003, it has produced data directly used
in 4116 refereed papers. Following a strong and regular in-
crease of publications during the first 8 yr, the number of papers
continued to increase, although at a slower pace, during the
last 5 yr, reaching a total of 502 for the year 2003.
The percentage of HST papers published in the aforemen-
2 See http://archive.stsci.edu/hst/search.php.
3 See http://adsabs.harvard.edu.
Figure 4-1: Number of refereed papers based on HST data by publication year (from
Meylan [52])
In all these forms, progr m managers ofte use his metric as a predictor for how
productive a telescope will be in the future based on its productivity in the past.
This is used to persuade funding agencies to grant the telescope program additional
funding to continue its mission.
Although this metric arguably best reflects the actual science return of a telescope,
its primary difficulty is that it cannot be computed a priori ; that is, before the
telescope has been launched. The metric can only be evaluated after the telescope
has been in use for some time, since there is a delay between data collection and
production of research papers. For this eason, the m tric has a systemi bias tow rds
telescopes that are older or have been operating for longer durations, since the data
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set is larger and scientists have more time to analyze it [53]. Furthermore, data
comes from specific instruments, but for telescopes with multiple instruments, it is
often unclear how to assign papers or citations to specific instruments. Papers are
often written on data collected from different instruments so as to use information in
different wavelengths on the same observed object [52]. For these reasons, using the
number of papers metric is not useful in the initial design phase, since it is restricted
to an a posteriori, or after-the-fact, analysis.
4.1.3 Discovery Efficiency
Another science metric more prevalent in the design of telescope instruments is the
discovery efficiency, which is defined as the product of two instrument properties:
• Field of view : the angular viewing area (arcsec2) visible to the instrument.
• Throughput : the fraction of photons detected by the instrument [54].
This captures the intrinsic value of data collected by the instrument: a larger
field of view and higher sensitivity represents more information, which corresponds
to increased discovery efficiency. In contrast to the number of papers metric, dis-
covery efficiency can be calculated a priori because it depends only on instrument
specifications that are known prior to launch (and perhaps before the instrument is
built).
This metric has two limitations. First, it can only be used with cameras, since
instruments such as spectrometers cannot be described by a field of view. Second,
discovery efficiency is often a function of wavelength, because science instruments
are often optimized for specific wavelength bands of interest (such as ultraviolet or
infrared). Thus, there may not be a single number that characterises the discovery
efficiency of an instrument. Figure 4-2 shows the discovery efficiency curves for several
HST science instruments. The problem of wavelength dependence can be avoided
by selecting the discovery efficiency at specific wavelengths to be the representative
value. For example, Joppin used two representative wavelengths (400 nm and 700
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Figure 4-2: Discovery efficiency of select HST Instruments (from STScI [55])
nm) to determine the discovery efficiency [53]. Alternatively, one can use the average
discovery efficiency as the representative value.
In the end, the discovery efficiency metric was selected for the telescope benefit
model because it is widely used in the community, it can be calculated a priori from
the design, and it captures some sense of the science worth of the instrument. The
analysis will be restricted to telescopes with cameras installed.
4.1.4 Modelling Technology Advancement
Servicing missions can upgrade instruments on a telescope and increase the discovery
efficiency of the complement of installed instruments. Servicing can become extremely
valuable because instrument technology has progressed exponentially, and future in-
struments can be orders of magnitude better than the initial ones installed.
This progression has been observed for charge-coupled devices (CCDs), which are
widely used on telescopes as image capture devices. A CCD consists of arrays of metal-
oxide-semiconductor (MOS) capacitors that can detect the excitation of electrons
caused by incoming photons [56]. Similar to computer chips, CCD technology has
improved dramatically in recent years. The size of CCD chips has decreased and the
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number of detectors (pixels) per unit area has increased exponentially [57].
A major difficulty in developing a future technology model is how to calculate
the numerical value for the discovery efficiency. Quantifying the discovery efficiency
requires design specifications for a particular instrument, which is not easily generaliz-
able. Fortunately, as described in Chapter 3, this framework investigates the marginal
change in science return between the Replacement and Servicing cases. It is therefore
not important to express the absolute value of the discovery efficiency, but instead
express the relative change of discovery efficiency from an older to a newer instru-
ment. To do so, the initial instrument is normalized to a non-dimensional discovery
efficiency of 10, and future instruments are assigned a discovery efficiency based on
how much better the instrument is compared to the initial one. For example, if the
field of view of the replacement instrument is four times larger than that of the initial
instrument, then the discovery efficiency of the replacement is set to be 40.
The discovery efficiency of new instrument technology through time was modelled
using a power law as shown in Equation 4.1, where DE is the discovery efficiency of
the best instrument technology at t years after program start. Note the discovery
efficiency is normalized to 10 at t = 0 years.
DE = 10ept (4.1)
The trend depends on a parameter p, which controls how quickly technology
evolves over time. The value of the parameter depends on the specific technology
trend data that is being used. The case study in Chapter 5 demonstrates the appli-
cation of example trend data to the discovery efficiency power law.
4.1.5 Modelling Telescope Science Return
The previous subsection discussed the advancement of instrument technology through
time, but this represents the technology that is available on Earth. The benefits of
advanced technology are transferred to the telescope only when the telescope is ser-
viced or replaced, so the framework requires a system to track the discovery efficiency
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of the telescope instruments through time, independent of the technology available
on the ground.
In this framework, the discovery efficiency of the instrument follows several simple
rules:
1. Without servicing or replacement, discovery efficiency remains constant through
time. Experience has shown that science instruments on space telescopes de-
grade by less than 1% per year1 [19], so the discovery efficiency can be approx-
imated as constant.
2. Increases in discovery efficiency can only occur if a new instrument is installed,
either via a servicing or replacement mission.
3. When a new instrument is installed, the discovery efficiency of the new instru-
ment lags the technology available on the ground.
This last point deserves further clarification. When a telescope is upgraded, it does
not get the best technology available at the time of upgrade. The technology used in
the instrument does not match the state-of-the-art at the time of servicing because the
instrument must be constructed in advance of the servicing mission. If the instrument
is installed at time T , then the instrument discovery efficiency is frozen some time
S before the instrument is sent to the telescope. For example, if a servicing mission
is launched in year T = 5 of the telescope program, but the instrument takes S = 1
year to build, the discovery efficiency of the instrument is frozen at the technology
level available in year four. The instrument construction latency S is represented in
the simulation as a parameter called upgrade latency.
Using these rules, the simulation tracks the telescope discovery efficiency through-
out its entire lifecycle, as shown in Figure 4-3. The jumps in the telescope discovery
efficiency represent the installation of new instruments, and the gap between the
state-of-the art and technology discovery efficiency is due to instrument construction
latency.
1Note this does not include failures that permanently disable the instrument.
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Figure 4-3: Discovery efficiency of state-of-the-art technology and the telescope
The integral of the telescope discovery efficiency curve is called the cumulative
science output (CSO) and represents the total science return of the telescope. This
will be used as a metric in Section 4.6 to compare the relative merits of Servicing and
Replacement cases.
4.2 Measuring Costs: Cost Models
In order to build and operate a space telescope, there are four primary sources of cost
that will be considered in this framework:
1. Initial Cost : The cost of program definition, research, development, fabrication,
and testing of the initial telescope, including all engineering components.
2. Science Instrument Cost : The cost of the instrument that generates science
data, and constitutes the payload of the telescope.
3. Launch Cost : The cost of launching the telescope into its operational location.
4. Operations Cost : The annual cost of operating the telescope from a mission
control station on Earth.
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Once the initial telescope is deployed, both the Replacement and Servicing cases
incur additional costs. As described in Section 3.2, the Replacement case requires the
construction of a new telescope from the same original design (but with an upgraded
science instrument), plus launch and operations costs. The Servicing case requires the
purchase of replacement components and new science instruments that are installed
onboard. In addition, before a telescope can be serviced it must be built to enable
servicing, which increases the initial costs. Finally, as described in Section 3.1, the
cost of the servicing missions themselves is not directly modelled and will be included
when the two cases are compared.
When this framework is implemented by an organization during telescope design,
they can use proprietary, high fidelity cost models; however, to show how these models
would be used in a simulation, this section will describe some first-order cost models
that were developed for demonstration purposes only.
The list of cost models are summarized in Table 4.1. The input to most of the
cost models is MLEO, or Mass to Low Earth Orbit. This metric was selected because
several NASA cost estimation tools are functions of launch mass, and this makes the
costs become functions of the size of the telescope. The output of all cost models is
in FY2000 US dollars.
Table 4.1: First-order cost models and their inputs
Cost Model Input
Initial Telescope MLEO
Instrument MLEO
Launch MLEO
Operations Initial Cost
Replacement Telescope MLEO
Replacement Components Number of Components
Serviceability Cost MLEO
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4.2.1 Initial Telescope Cost
All costs incurred before the initial telescope is launched are classified as initial costs,
which includes research, development, construction, and testing,. In the simulation,
initial costs are calculated using the Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM) [58].
This provides rough order-of-magnitude estimates of the cost of constructing a variety
of vehicle types for different types of missions. It is implemented as a web-based
application, which was ported into MATLAB for use in the simulation.
The AMCM, shown in Equation 4.2, is a power law defined by a set of parameters.
InitCost = a×Qb ×W c × ds × e0.01 ×Bf × gD × INF91 (4.2)
Different vehicle types are represented with different parameters (represented as
lower-case letters). To analyze telescopes, the law was used with the Physics and
Astronomy Spacecraft parameter set, which was generated by fitting a curve through
the historical set of spacecraft that performed physics and astronomical experiments.
In addition, the INF91 parameter is a multiplicative factor that inflates the cost data
from 1991 dollars to 2000 dollars. These parameters are summarized in Table 4.2.
In addition to the fitting parameters, there are also three user-defined parameters:
• Block Number (B): The level of design inheritance in the system. A block
number of n implies that the telescope in question is the nth iteration using the
same design. The telescope is assumed to be an all-new design, so B = 1.
Table 4.2: Parameters for the Operations Cost model
Parameter Value Parameter Value
a 0.000504839 f -0.355322218
b 0.594183076 g 1.554982942
c 0.653947922 s 2.170
d 76.99939424 INF91 1.414
e 1.68051e-52
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Figure 4-4: Initial Cost as a function of MLEO
• Difficulty (D): The level of programmatic and technical difficulty anticipated
for the new system compared to previous, similar space systems. Difficulty is
rated on a scale of [-2 -1 0 1 2], corresponding to [very low/low/avg/high/very
high] difficulty. Telescopes are highly complex spacecraft and the difficulty is
at least “high”, so D = 1.
• Quantity (Q): The total number of units to be produced. The initial telescope is
built only once (not including any replacements, which are treated separately),
so Q = 1.
It gives the initial cost of a telescope as a function of the telescope launch mass
(MLEO), represented in the equation as W (pounds). With all the fitting and
program-specific parameters specified, the model gives an estimate for the initial
cost of the telescope given its initial mass. Figure 4-4 shows the output of this model
for telescopes with MLEO between 0 kg and 20,000 kg.
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4.2.2 Instrument Costs
Spacecraft can be generally separated into two segments: the payload (the components
that perform the intended function of the spacecraft), and the bus (the components
that supports the payload). In this framework, the bus consists of all engineering
components and the optical telescope assembly (mirrors, etc), and the payload con-
sists of the science instrument(s). The bus construction cost is calculated with the
Initial Costs model, but a separate cost model is needed to model the cost of the
science instruments.
Instrument costs can increase or decrease through time depending on how tech-
nology evolves. Costs may increase due to the use of highly advanced technology in
an instrument, or costs may decrease as previously expensive components come down
the manufacturing learning curve. The experience of HST, however, shows that there
was no general trend for the cost of installed instruments, despite the fact that they
became increasingly powerful through time. Table 4.3 shows a selection of instrument
costs throughout the HST program [17, 59]. The later instruments, despite being far
more advanced than the ones initially installed on HST, do not have correspondingly
large cost increases. On the contrary, in some cases the instrument cost decreases
from one generation to the next. In addition, the instrument cost can be dependent
on the size of the telescope, as larger telescopes can support larger and more complex
instruments.
In the simulation, the cost of the telescope is defined to be directly proportional
to telescope mass and constant through time. From HST, the mass of the telescope
is approximately 11,000 kg and has a historical cost per instrument of approximately
$100M (in constant dollars). The resulting instrument cost model as a function of
telescope MLEO is shown in Figure 4-5. As for the lack of time-dependence, HST has
shown that the cost of the instrument can be approximated as constant. Of course,
the model can be improved dramatically with more accurate relations for projected
future instrument costs.
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Table 4.3: Cost of selected HST Instruments (WFC3 to be launched in 2008)
Parameter Year Installed Cost
WFPC1 1990 $130M
WFPC2 1993 $127M
NICMOS 1999 $105M
STIS 1999 $125M
ACS 2002 $75M
WFC3 2008 $83M
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Figure 4-5: Instrument Cost as a function of MLEO
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4.2.3 Launch Costs
Once the telescope is constructed and equipped with science instruments, it must be
launched from Earth to its operational location. For the simulation, a launch cost
model was developed using cost data from current launch vehicle systems [60, 61].
Launch vehicles are often available in a family, which is a set of configurations for
a launch vehicle to support different MLEO quantities. Each of these configurations
has a set price. For example, the Delta II launch vehicle family has two variants: a
Delta 7320 and a Delta 7920, with maximum MLEOs of 2760 kg and 5045 kg, and
total launch costs of $40M and $50M, respectively [61]. Table 4.4 shows the set of
major launch families available in 2007, along with configurations and launch prices
(expressed in FY2004 dollars)
For each family, a linear or polynomial equation was fit through the set of (MLEO,
cost) data points in that family, as shown in Figure 4-6. The gap for MLEO between
5100 and 8600 kg exists because no launch vehicles are designed to launch single
payloads of this size into LEO. To account for this deficiency, a linear interpolation
is computed between the two points that bound the gap. There is also a gap for
telescopes up to an MLEO of 1220 kg, which is resolved by setting a constant launch
price of $20M for this range. The final model consists of a set of lowest launch costs
for telescopes with MLEO up to 20,000 kg, as shown in Figure 4-7. In order to convert
the cost into FY2000 dollars, the launch cost data discussed above is deflated by a
factor of 0.908 [62].
Note there is an implicit assumption in this model that the telescope is compatible
with the launch vehicle fairing. The model assumes that if a telescope has a specified
MLEO, the design engineers will ensure that the telescope fits into the fairing. A
more complete model would use both the dimensions and mass of the telescope to
determine the appropriate launch vehicle.
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Table 4.4: Launch vehicle family data
Vehicle Max MLEO Cost (FY2004)
Delta 7320 2867 $40M
Delta 7920 5139 $50M
Delta IV M+ 8600 $133M
Delta IV M+ (4.2) 11700 $138M
Atlas V 402 12500 $138M
Atlas V 532 17250 $192M
Atlas V 552 20050 $252M
Ariane 5G 16000 $180M
Athena I 820 $40M
Athena II 2065 $45M
ARPA Taurus 1220 $20M
Taurus 1300 $24M
Taurus XL 1500 $28M
Taurus XLS 1900 $32M
Pegasus XL 443 $20M
Minotaur 607 $19M
Falcon I 668 $6M
80
Atlas V Family
y = 1E-06x2 - 0.0283x + 283.21
Taurus Family
y = -3E-05x2 + 0.1039x - 64.7
Delta II Family
y = 0.0044x + 27.381
Delta IV M+ Family
y = 0.0016x + 119.13
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Figure 4-7: Launch Cost as a function of MLEO
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4.2.4 Operations Costs
After the telescope is deployed, it must be operated from the ground throughout its
life. For the first-order approximation, the annual operations costs of a telescope
program is provided by the Mission Operations Cost Model (MOCM) [63], which
provides a rough order-of-magnitude estimate of aggregate annual operations costs
based on historical data of spacecraft in operation between 1962 and 1990.
As with the AMCM, the MOCM consists of a power law defined by a set of
parameters. Unlike the AMCM, however, the input to the cost model is not the
telescope MLEO; rather, the investment cost, which is the total development and
production cost of the telescope. This quantity is output from the Initial Cost model
described in Section 4.2.1. By using the output of the initial cost model as input to
the MOCM, the annual operations cost can be calculated.
The cost per year (opsCost) is given by the power law in Equation 4.3.
opsCost = a×
(
initCost
INF87
)b
× INF87 (4.3)
initCost is the total initial cost of the telescope, a and b are constants whose values
come from the Physics and Astronomy parameter set. The data set is expressed in
FY1987 dollars, so INF87 is a multiplier to inflate the costs to FY2000 dollars.
The parameters are summarized in Table 4.5, and the output of this model for a
range of MLEO values is shown in Figure 4-8.
Table 4.5: Parameters for the Operations Cost model
Parameter Value
a 0.047
b 0.878
INF87 1.689
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Figure 4-8: Operations Cost as a function of MLEO
4.2.5 Costs for the Replacement Case
In the Replacement Case, when the initial telescope fails, it is replaced with an exact
copy. Replacement incurs three primary costs:
• The fabrication of the replacement telescope.
• The construction of the instrument installed on the replacement telescope.
• The launch of the replacement telescope.
The launch cost and the cost of the science instrument can be determined using
the Launch Cost and Science Instrument Cost models described above. For the con-
struction cost of the second (replacement) telescope, recall that for the Replacement
Case, the second telescope is a copy of the initial telescope. This means that the
telescope is constructed and tested without having to repeat all the design and devel-
opment work that was required for the initial telescope. Since the second telescope is
identical to the first telescope (from the same design), the cost of the second telescope
is equal to the fraction of the initial cost of the first telescope that was spent on fab-
rication. This fraction is called the fabrication fraction, which is represented in the
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simulation as the fab fraction parameter. In addition to saving money by reusing
the design, fabricating the replacement telescope will also benefit from learning ef-
fects, which capture the experience gained by building a product, which improves
productivity and decreases costs when building subsequent copies [62]. The learning
effect is represented in the simulation as the learn curve parameter.
Combining the fabrication fraction and learning effects, the cost of the replacement
telescope is expressed in Equation 4.4 [64] as a fraction of the initial cost (initCost)
of the first telescope
replaceCost = initCost × fab fraction× (2B − 1)
B = 1− lg
(
1
learn curve
− 2
)
(4.4)
4.2.6 Costs for the Servicing Case
In the Servicing case, when the telescope fails, the worn-out components are replaced
and the science instruments are upgraded. Servicing incurs four costs:
• The telescope must be designed with serviceability, which incurs additional costs
in the initial design phase.
• The construction of the science instrument installed during servicing.
• The purchase of components to replace the ones that have failed, or are likely
to fail soon, on the telescope.
• The servicing mission itself.
Incorporating serviceability involves additional up-front design effort to modular-
ize components into replacement units and includes servicing infrastructure such as
docking mechanisms, servicing hardpoints, access doors, etc. This is an extremely
difficult quantity to estimate since it requires detailed information about the design
of a telescope. In the simulation, a simple, multiplicative parameter represents the
increase in initial costs to include serviceability in the design. This factor is applied to
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the initial cost of the telescope to determine the new initial cost of the serviceable tele-
scope, and is represented in the simulation as serviceable inc. For example, if the
initial cost must be increased by X% to enable servicing, then the serviceable inc
is equal to (1 +X).
The cost of the new science instruments uses the Science Instrument cost model
discussed above in Section 4.2.2. The cost of replacement components is represented
in the simulation as cost replace. The cost of the servicing mission itself will be
calculated in accordance with the method discussed in Section 3.1, where the servicing
cost is represented as the maximum price that program managers are willing to pay
in order to perform servicing missions.
4.2.7 Cost Model Summary
The cost models described above were simplified versions of code that would be placed
into the simulation framework. This was done to demonstrate how the framework can
be implemented. If the framework were used to make decisions on an actual telescope
program, much more accurate (and often proprietary) cost models are required. The
framework was designed to be modular so that higher fidelity models can be added
as needed.
The results of these cost models are used to determine estimates of the total life-
cycle costs for telescope programs with either replacement or servicing. When adding
up all program costs, no discount rate applied, since NASA budgeting practices for
space programs do not incorporate discounted cash flows for multi-year projects.
These cost estimates, coupled with the science benefits, will be used when compar-
ing the Replacement and Servicing cases, with the goal of determining the value of
serviceability in a telescope design. There is no discount rate applied, since NASA
budgeting practices for space programs do not incorporate discounted cash flows for
multi-year projects.
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4.3 Telescope Model
A telescope consists of many subsystems that work together to support the science-
gathering instruments. In this framework, a telescope is represented as a collection of
component sets, where each component set is a collection of individual components.
This hierarchy is shown in Figure 4-9. For example, HST is equipped with a set of six
rate-sensing units (RSUs). The RSUs contain gyroscopes and electronics that provide
orientation information to the attitude determination and control system (ADCS), so
that HST can be stabilized and accurately pointed at celestial objects.
Component
Component
        Set
TELESCOPE
Figure 4-9: Hierarchy of components in the telescope model
A component set is represented by three variables in the simulation:
• Total number of components initially installed in the component set.
• Active number of components in the total that are operational at any time
under nominal conditions.
• Minimum number of components that must be functioning for the telescope to
be operational.
The distinction between total and active is needed because each component is
not necessarily active at the start of the mission. Spacecraft subsystems often are
designed with redundancy, so that the telescope can remain operational in case of
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single component failures. Returning to the HST example, not all RSUs are needed
at all times. Of the six RSUs onboard, at least three are needed for normal operations.
When one of the active RSUs fail, a backup RSU is brought online to replace it [25]. As
discussed in Subsection 3.3.3, the components each have a state that can be influenced
by probabilistic events. In the framework, each component in the component sets can
be in one of three states:
• Active: the component is currently operational and subject to failures.
• Standby : the component is not operational, but can become active later if
needed (has not already failed).
• Failed : the component was formerly active and suffered a failure event, and
cannot become active again.
At the start of the mission, the required number of components in each set is set
to active status, and the rest are set on standby. In the HST RSU example, a total
of six are installed and four of those are normally active, so at the beginning of the
mission, four were set to active status, and the remaining two were on standby. As
the mission progresses, active components will fail, and standby units are activated
in order to replace these failed components. In this simulation, standby refers to
the concept of cold standby in reliability engineering. Components in cold standby
are not subject to the specified failure distributions and cannot fail until brought to
active status. In contrast, components that are on hot standby are operating just as
if it were active, and are subject to failure.
The transitions between these three states, and the events that cause these tran-
sitions, are shown in the state diagram in Figure 4-10. The transition of components
from one state to another are described in Section 4.4 (component failures) and Sec-
tion 4.5 (servicing decision model). Note that failed components can only be returned
to a non-failed status (active or standby) via servicing.
The components in each component set are independent and identically distributed.
The failure of one component does not affect the failure of other components (inde-
pendent), and each component in a component set has the same failure distribution
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Figure 4-10: Possible states and transitions for each component
(identically distributed). It is reasonable to assume that components from the same
manufacturing process are identically distributed. Information about the distribution
can come from actual failure rate data from flight hardware or from design specifica-
tions from the manufacturer. The independence of components, however, is a major
simplifying assumption that appears in the simulation twice. First, each component
set is assumed to be independent of other sets; that is, failures in one subsystem
do not cascade to others in the telescope. This can be justified based on the HST
experience, as most of failures thus far in the HST program are the result of random
or wearout failures in individual components. Second, components within a set are
assumed to fail independently of others in the same set, which may not be reasonable
due to common-cause failures2 [49]. Common-cause failures were observed in HST,
since a manufacturing defect in the RSUs caused them to wear out earlier than ex-
pected [65]. The exclusion of common-cause failures is a limitation that should be
addressed in future work.
4.4 Modelling Uncertainty: Stochastic Analysis
The stochastic model can handle two types of failure distributions: exponential and
non-exponential. For exponentially distributed components, the failure rate λ(t), does
not depend on the time t that the component has been operational (i.e., λ(t) = λ).
For this reason, exponentially distributed components are often called memoryless ;
2A common-cause failure is a failure that affects multiple components at once
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that is, they have no memory of prior events and are only subject to random failures.
The probability that the component will fail in the next time step is given by Equation
4.5, where ∆t is the size of the time step.
Pr(failure in next∆t | operational at T ) = 1− exp(−λ ·∆t) (4.5)
For non-exponentially distributed components, the stochastic model accepts user-
defined functions to compute failure probabilities. For example, the Weibull distribu-
tion is commonly used in reliability analysis to model the effects of wearout. Unlike
the exponential distribution, the failure rate λ(t) is not constant through time [66]. A
Weibull distribution depends on two parameters: a scale parameter η (with dimension
of time), and a dimensionless shape parameter β [67]. For small time steps ∆t, the
probability of failure in an operational component from time T to T +∆t is expressed
in Equation 4.6.
λ(T ) =
(
β
η
) (
T
η
)β−1
Pr(failure in next∆t | operational at T ) = 1− exp(−λ(T ) ·∆t)
(4.6)
At each time step in the simulation, these models are evaluated to determine the
probability that the component has failed. The results are used to update the state
of the component sets on the telescope. The updated telescope state is used in the
Decision Analysis portion of the simulation discussed below.
4.5 Modelling Management: Decision Analysis
In the two As-Needed subcases, decisions on when to service or replace the telescope
are made during the program (on-the-fly) rather than during the design phase. To
model this on-the-fly decision making, a decision analysis model was developed as a
series of decision points through time. The decision of whether or not to replace or
service was evaluated at each discrete time step in the simulation until the telescope
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ceases operations at the end of the program, which is designated the end of life (EOL)
condition. The decision analysis is executed in three separate stages.
4.5.1 Decision Stage One: Mission Eligibility
The first stage of the decision analysis, shown in Figure 4-11, starts after the stochastic
analysis evaluates random events and updates the telescope state. The decision anal-
ysis first determines if the telescope is eligible to be serviced or replaced. Eligibility
is determined by two criteria. First, the simulation has a specified maximum number
of servicing or replacement missions, represented by the num serv and num repl pa-
rameters, respectively. If the telescope has already received the maximum number of
missions allowed, it is ineligible for further missions. Second, the simulation checks if
the telescope has entered the servicing blackout period, which is a set time before the
end of the nominal mission duration where no servicing or replacement can occur.
It is conceivable that mission planners will not want to service the telescope if it is
nearing the end of its nominal mission phase, since in their mind the mission is “al-
most done” and thus servicing is not worthwhile. The length of the blackout period
is represented in the simulation as no service period.
Telescopes that are ineligible for servicing will continue to operate until they fail,
at which point the program is terminated (and the EOL condition is signalled). If,
on the other hand, the telescope is eligible, then the decision analysis checks if the
telescope is operational. The telescope is operational if, for each of the component
sets, the number of functioning components is greater than or equal to the minimum
required. Conversely, the telescope is not operational if any of the component sets do
not meet this minimum requirement. For example, HST requires a minimum of three
RSUs to perform science operations. If the simulation showed that only two RSUs
are functioning (and the rest have failed), the telescope is inoperative and a servicing
or replacement mission must be pre-emptively sent. However, if the telescope is
operational and has not yet failed, a servicing or replacement mission may still be
needed if the telescope is near failure.
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Figure 4-11: Decision Analysis Stage One
Near failure is defined in terms of a quantity called the probability of future op-
erations (PFO). The PFO is the probability that, given the telescope is operational
at time T , the telescope will be operational at time T +X. Thus a telescope is near
failure when the PFO drops below a specified threshold. This signifies that there is a
significant chance that the telescope will fail in the immediate future, and a servicing
or replacement mission must be sent. If the PFO is higher than the threshold, it is
unlikely to fail soon, so no mission is required. The threshold used to make deci-
sions about sending missions is represented as a parameter in the simulation called
min pfo, which can be changed depending on the program manager’s preference.
The parameter X is called the time horizon of the reliability analysis and repre-
sents how far into the future program managers look to see if the telescope is still
operational. This parameter is critical to ensure servicing and replacement missions
are effective. If the time horizon is too short, then the decision to service or replace
may be made too late: the telescope may already be near failure, and by the time
the mission is executed, the telescope has failed. On the other hand, if the time
horizon is too long, then a servicing or replacement mission may be sent too early
and will service or replace a telescope that is nowhere near failure. This forward-
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looking technique was also used in a National Research Council study of future HST
servicing missions [68]. The time horizon parameter is represented in the simulation
as future rel yrs.
The probability that the telescope is operational at a future time is the probabil-
ity that all the component sets are operational at that future time. If there are q
component sets in a telescope, and the ith component set is represented as Sk, then
the probability that the telescope is operational is the product of the probabilities
that each component set is operational, as shown in Equation 4.7:
Pr(Operational at time t) = Pr(S1 ops)× Pr(S2 ops)× ...× Pr(Sq ops) (4.7)
The kth component set contains nk components, where at least rk of them must
be active for the set to be operational. The probability that the kth component set is
operational is the probability that at least rk components in the set are active; that
is, there are at least rk components that have not failed. The probability that this
occurs is given by Equation 4.8:
Pr(at least rk active) =
nk∑
i=rk
Pr(exactly i components active) (4.8)
The probability that exactly i out of nk components are active is the sum of
probabilities of each combination where i components are active and nk−i components
have failed. There are
(
nk
i
)
such combinations. For example, for nk = 3 and i = 2,
the probability that exactly i are operational is shown in Equation 4.9, where Ci is
the probability that the ith component is operational.
C1C2(1− C3) + C1C3(1− C2) + C2C3(1− C1) (4.9)
The above equations are used to calculate the overall PFO, which is used by the
decision model to determine if the telescope is near failure and requires servicing or
replacement.
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Figure 4-12: Decision Analysis Stage Two
4.5.2 Decision Stage Two: Mission Wait Time
The second stage of the decision analysis, shown in Figure 4-12, is triggered when the
simulation has determined that the telescope needs servicing or replacement. The
telescope cannot be immediately serviced or replaced because there is a time delay
associated with the decision to send a mission - it must wait until the mission is
ready. In the case of servicing, the servicer spacecraft must be built, tested, and
launched. Similarly, in the case of replacement, the telescope itself must be built,
which presumably would take longer than building the servicer spacecraft since it
will most likely be a more complex system. The latency duration is dependent on
the speed at which the servicer spacecraft or telescope could be built. The latencies
associated with servicing and replacement missions are represented in the simulation
as serv latency and replace latency, respectively. While waiting for the mission
to be launched, the telescope operates normally (or remains inoperative if already
failed).
4.5.3 Decision Stage Three: Mission Execution
The third stage of the decision analysis, shown in Figure 4-13, examines the events
that occur once the servicing or replacement mission is sent. There are three prob-
abilistic events that may occur during a mission, each of which is specified by a
parameter in the simulation:
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Figure 4-13: Decision Analysis Stage Three
• Launch Failure: The replacement telescope fails to be launched, which results
in the loss of the replacement. The probability that a launch failure occurs is
represented in the simulation as risk launch fail.
• Servicing Failure: The servicing mission fails to upgrade and/or repair the tele-
scope but does not damage the telescope. This event can occur either through
a failure during launch or operations. The probability of this event occurring is
represented in the simulation as risk service fail.
• Catastrophic Failure: The servicing mission inadvertently disables or destroys
the telescope. This will end the telescope program and represents an EOL
condition. The probability that a catastrophic failure occurs is represented in
the simulation as risk cat fail.
If none of these events occurs, the mission is a success. In the Replacement case,
the second telescope is deployed, without risk to the first telescope3, and begins
producing science data. In the Servicing case, the telescope may be repaired and/or
upgraded, and the specific actions that take place during a servicing mission depend
on the state of both the instruments and components.
3If the initial telescope is still operating, the replacement telescope could be launched to an orbit
that does not endanger the initial one.
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If an instrument has been upgraded recently, it is unlikely that mission planners
would want to replace the expensive science instrument so early in its life for two
reasons. First, telescope instruments are expensive, so scientists and program man-
agers would like the instrument to be used for a while before upgrading it with a
new one. Second, if the instrument is upgraded rapidly, the discovery efficiency of
the replacement will not be significantly higher than that of the original. To account
for this issue, the simulation contains a minimum upgrade time parameter, which is
the minimum amount of time that the instrument must operate before it can be up-
graded. If the servicing mission is sent before the minimum upgrade time has elapsed,
the instrument will not be upgraded. This parameter is represented in the simulation
as min upgrade time.
The components that are replaced via servicing are those that failed (corrective
action) and those that are close to failure (preventive action). A component is deemed
close to failure if it has been active for a certain amount of time; components that
were never active or were active for a short time are deemed healthy enough to remain
on the spacecraft. Preventive maintenance is attractive since the marginal cost of re-
placing additional components while performing servicing is small; however, replacing
all components during each servicing mission is both impractical and cost prohibitive.
The minimum time that a component must be active in order to be replaced during
servicing is represented in the simulation as a parameter called min replace time.
Once the telescope is replaced or serviced, the telescope state is updated and it
returns to the first stage of the decision analysis and the time is incremented. This
process continues until an EOL condition is detected, at which time the program ends
and the simulation stops.
4.6 Determining Value: Program Comparison
One run of the simulation contains the record of events, both of degradation (failures)
and renewal (servicing or replacement), during the telescope program from deploy-
ment to end-of-life. For each run, there are two primary metrics that are calculated:
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• Cumulative Science Output : The total amount of science return that is gen-
erated over the life of the telescope program. This is the net benefit of the
program.
• Total Lifecycle Cost : The total amount of money spent on the program from
all cost sources (except for the cost of servicing missions in the Servicing case).
This represents the net cost of the program.
In addition to these general metrics, there are secondary metrics that provide in-
sight into other aspects of the telescope program. Each secondary metric is applicable
to one or both of the Replacement or Servicing cases, as noted below.
• Program Lifetime: The duration between launch and end-of-life of the telescope
program. This is applicable in both Cases.
• Time Oﬄine: The total duration during which the telescope operations are
suspended while waiting for a servicing or replacement mission. During this
time, the telescope is not generating any science data. This is applicable in
both Cases.
• Mission Overlap: The amount of time that two telescopes are operating simul-
taneously. This is applicable in the Replacement Case only.
• Initial Telescope Failure Time: The time at which the first telescope fails. This
is applicable in the Replacement Case only.
• Initial Servicing Mission Time: The time at which the first servicing mission is
sent to the telescope. This is applicable in the Servicing Case only.
The value of serviceability can be determined using the simulation framework by
performing the following steps.
Pre-Simulation: Program Definition
As described throughout this chapter, before the simulation can be executed, the
models in the simulation must be initialized with data on the telescope program.
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This requires that the telescope itself must be defined (in terms of components and
component sets), and the various parameters described in the previous sections must
be set. As described in Subsection 3.3.3, the simulation will be executed many times
in a Monte-Carlo style method so that the dependence on the particular set of random
events is removed.
Step 1: Replacement Case Analysis
The first step is to execute the simulation for the Replacement case, to determine the
probability distributions of the primary and secondary metrics for both Replacement
subcases. As discussed in Section 3.2, this generates the baseline budget and science
return to which the Servicing case is compared.
Step 2: Servicing Case Analysis
Similar to the Replacement case, the second step is to execute the simulation for
the Servicing case to calculate the primary and secondary metrics for both Servicing
subcases. Remember that the lifecycle cost of the telescope program in the Servicing
case does not include the cost of the servicing mission: this is accounted for in Step
3 of the comparison (see below).
Step 3: Program Comparison
The third step will determine the value of servicing by comparing the costs and ben-
efits separately. Comparing the benefits of the two cases will determine the amount
of science return in the Servicing case as compared to the baseline Replacement case.
This can be expressed as an increase factor. For example, if the Servicing case gener-
ates twice as much science return as the baseline Replacement case, then the science
return increase is 2.0. Note that if the factor is less than 1.0, then the Servicing case
has produced less science return than the Replacement case.
Comparing the costs of the two cases will determine the maximum price of each
servicing mission as discussed in Section 3.1. The lifecycle cost of the Replacement
case represents the baseline budget for the program. Since the lifecycle cost computed
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for the Servicing case does not include the cost of servicing, the gap between the base-
line budget and the Servicing case represents the remaining budget that is available
to pay for servicing missions. The remaining budget is the maximum amount that
can be spent on servicing missions without exceeding the baseline budget.
This process can be repeated for multiple numbers of servicing missions. This
will to provide decision-makers information about how much science return can be
gained by performing one, two, three, etc. servicing missions, and the maximum price
for each mission. This can inform both design decisions (should the telescope design
include serviceability?) and programmatic decisions (should the budget be increased
in order to pay for more servicing missions and get more science?) .
Post-Simulation: Sensitivity Analysis
The results of the simulation are dependent on the particular set of parameters that
were put into the simulation. Sensitivity analysis involves changing these parameters
to determine their effect on the primary and secondary metrics.
4.7 Framework Summary
This chapter described the construction of a framework to analyze the value of ser-
viceability in a telescope design. The framework is implemented by a set of models
that were developed in this chapter as well. Some of these models are generally ap-
plicable, while others were developed for demonstration purposes only and should be
replaced with higher-fidelity models when the framework is used in a real telescope
project. These models are based on a set of parameters, which are summarized in
Table 4.6.
The next chapter contains a case study which demonstrates how the framework
can be used. The parameters will be set with representative data, and the simulation
will be executed to determine the value of serviceability for an example telescope
program.
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Table 4.6: Input Parameters for the Simulation
Program Parameters
drymass Telescope Size
max life Nominal mission duration
num serv Maximum number of servicing missions (Servicing case only)
num repl Maximum number of replacement missions (Replacement case only)
Type of program sub-case (mission at fixed times or on-failure)
Simulation Parameters
dt Simulation time step size
Decision Rule Parameters
min pfo Minimum PFO below which a mission is sent
future rel yrs Number of years into future to look forward in PFO calculations
serv latency Latency in servicing mission execution
replace latency Latency in replacement mission execution
upgrade latency Instrument construction lead time
no service period Time before nominal mission end when no servicing is performed
min upgrade time Minimum operating time before an instrument can be upgraded
min replace time Minimum operating time before components can be pre-emptively replaced
Risk Probabilities
risk launch fail Risk of launch failure (Replacement case only)
risk service fail Risk of servicing mission failure (Servicing case only)
risk cat fail Risk of catastrophic failure (Servicing case only)
Cost Parameters
learn curve Learning effect percentage
fab fraction Fraction of total initial cost spent on fabrication
serviceable inc Fractional cost increase to incorporate serviceability
cost replace Cost of each replacement component
Telescope Model Parameters (for each component set)
num comp Total number of components per set
num ops Active number of components per set
num needed Minimum number of components required per set
Hazard rate and reliability parameters
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Chapter 5
Framework in Action:
An HST-Based Case Study
Now that the simulation framework has been established in Chapter 4, it is ready to
be used to analyze the value of incorporating serviceability in a telescope design. This
chapter describes a case study of a telescope program, which is a sample execution
of the simulation that uses a simplified telescope design and representative numbers
for telescope parameters. The telescope and parameter information was derived from
HST wherever possible.
The objectives of this case study are twofold. First, it will demonstrate how the
simulation framework can be used to determine the value of servicing. Second, it will
highlight some general insights about servicing within telescope programs, and how
the framework can be used to generate further insights. The case study is executed
in four stages, which are the same stages that would be performed if the simulation
were used during a real design project. The following sections discuss each of these
stages in turn.
1. Define the telescope program to be modelled.
2. Define all simulation parameters.
3. Execute the simulation and analyze the results.
4. Perform a sensitivity analysis on the simulation parameters.
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5.1 Defining the System: Telescope Model
As described in Section 4.3, the telescope is modelled as a group of component sets,
where each component set is a group of independent, identically distributed compo-
nents. The component sets must be explicitly specified in the simulation before the
analysis can be performed. For a real project, the telescope model would represent
all component sets in the design; however, this can render the simulation computa-
tionally expensive. For this case study, a simplified model of the telescope will be
used, which contains a limited set of components.
If only selected components are included, then those should be the ones that
contribute the most to telescope failure. This requires information about the failure
rates of telescope components. In the case of HST, this information is provided by
the Aerospace Corporation [69] in a report on the reliability of HST midway through
its life. The report identified the ten components installed on HST that are reliability
drivers, which are the components that are most likely to cause HST to fail in the
near future. The reliability drivers are described in Table 5.1, where R(6 yrs) is the
probability that the component set will be operational in 6 years.
This case study will use four of the top five HST reliability driver components1.
For each of these components, the report specifies a failure distribution and associ-
ated parameters, which is based on design specifications, testing, and on-orbit flight
experience. The failure data used in the simulation are summarized in Table 5.2, and
they are used in the manner described by Section 4.4.
The payload of the telescope, which in general consists of multiple scientific in-
struments, is modelled as a single infrared camera in this case study. An infrared
camera is selected to ensure that the discovery efficiency metric and the instrument
technology data described in Section 4.1 are valid. The camera is assumed to not
be subject to random failures. This is a simplifying assumption, but it is reasonable
because HST has shown that bus components failures have been more critical than
instrument failures. Future work can modify this assumption.
1Of the top five components, the Data Management Unit (DMU) is excluded because it is an
aggregate of many other components, and the report does not quote a failure rate for the DMU
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As well, the overall telescope program modelled in the case study will match the
properties of the HST program. There are two parameters that define the telescope
program: the nominal mission duration and the size of the telescope. The nominal
mission duration is set to 15 years, as was the case for HST. A longer mission dura-
tion was selected so that either replacement or servicing must be performed for the
telescope to remain operational: it is extremely unlikely that the telescope will last
15 years without intervention. The mass of the telescope is set to 11,000 kg, which is
approximately equal to the HST mass of 11,100 kg [1].
Table 5.1: Cost sources for a telescope program (from Wong [69])
Rank Component R(6 yrs)
1 Fine Guidance Sensors 0.7025
2 Data Management Unit 0.7377
3 Rate Gyro 0.7998
4 Reaction Wheel Assembly 0.8519
5 Solid State Recorder 0.8642
6 Power Distribution Unit 0.8950
7 Electrical Power/Thermal Control Electronics 0.9118
8 Power Control Unit 0.9208
9 Science Instrument computer 0.9377
10 Solar Array Electronics Control 0.9511
Table 5.2: Failure rate data used in the case study (from Wong [69])
Component Total Active Min Type Parameter
Fine Guidance Sensors 3 3 2 Exponential λ = 8.5335× 10−6
Reaction Wheel Assembly 4 4 3 Exponential λ = 3.7318× 10−6
Solid State Recorder 2 2 1 Exponential λ = 8.7468× 10−6
Rate Sensing Unit 6 3 3 Weibull η = 5.894, β = 4.82
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5.2 Setting the Dials: Parameter Specification
The simulation contains many parameters, as described in Chapter 4. Before the
simulation can be executed, all of these parameters must be fully specified. In this
case study, the parameters will be set using educated guesses, data from the HST
program, or historical aerospace industry data. This section describes how each
parameter was set, and the parameter settings are summarized in Table 5.3.
5.2.1 Technology Advancement Model
Section 4.1.4 developed an exponential model to represent the discovery efficiency
(DE ) of instrument technology through time, reproduced here as Equation 5.1:
DE = 10ept (5.1)
Setting the rate parameter p requires data on future technology trends. This case
study will use a projected trend of infrared CCD technology from [57] as a surrogate
for discovery efficiency. This trend represents the progression of detector sensitivity,
measured in the number of pixels per chip, as shown in Figure 5-1. Note the loga-
rithmic scale on the y-axis, so the trend is a power law in the form of Equation 5.1
with parameter p = 0.3218. The resulting power law of instrument technology that
is used in this case study is shown in Figure 5-2.
5.2.2 Decision Model Parameters
PFO Threshold (min pfo)
This parameter sets the minimum threshold of probability of future operations (PFO).
A servicing or replacement mission is sent when the telescope PFO drops below this
threshold. When NASA planned for HST servicing missions, engineers used a thresh-
old future reliability level of 50% to determine the interval between servicing missions
[68]. For this case study, the decision threshold is set to 50% to match the NASA
methodology.
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3. What Are IR Detectors Trends?
¾ Improved performance (detectivity, 
productivity, operability, filling factor etc) 
¾ Highly condensed: smaller pixels, large array
¾ Wider spectral range, Multi-colour
¾ Si-compatible materials and technology
¾ Faster time response
¾ Fast read-out IC
¾ Active pixels
¾ Higher operating temperature
Generally following Moore’s law, but IR detectors leg about a decade behind 
dynamic RAM development.
128M
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Figure 5-1: Future projections of detector technology (from Xin [57])
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Figure 5-2: Discovery efficiency of state-of-the-art technology
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Servicing / Replacement Latency (serv latency, repl latency)
This parameter specifies the delay between when the decision is made to perform a
servicing or replacement mission and when the mission is executed. The parameter
depends on the speed at which the servicer spacecraft or replacement telescope could
be built. For this case study, the servicing and replacement latencies are set to 1 years
and 2 years, respectively, which are broad estimates of turnaround time for spacecraft
construction (without development time).
Instrument Construction Lead Time (upgrade latency)
This parameter specifies the amount of time that is required to construct a new in-
strument that will be installed during a servicing mission. This instrument must be
built in advance of the launch, and the duration of this time delay is estimated in
this case study to be 1 year.
Time Horizon of Reliability Analysis (future rel yrs)
This parameter sets how far into the future the reliability of the telescope is calcu-
lated. In this case study, the future reliability threshold is set to be comparable to the
latencies for servicing and replacement so that the decision lead time roughly matches
the lag in execution. A small margin is added to provide additional assurance that the
decision will be made well in advance. The time horizon is 1.5 years for the Servicing
case and 2.5 years for the Replacement case.
Servicing Blackout Period (no service period)
This parameter sets the length of time before the end of the nominal mission dura-
tion where no servicing will occur. This case study assumes that the telescope will be
serviced as needed throughout the entire nominal mission duration, so the servicing
blackout period is zero years.
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Minimum Upgrade Time (min upgrade time)
This parameter sets the minimum time that an instrument must operate before it
can be upgraded by a servicing mission. In this case study, instruments must operate
for at least two years before an upgrade to ensure that it is used sufficiently before
being replaced.
Component Replacement Time (min replace time)
This parameter controls the minimum time components must operate before they are
replaced through preventive maintenance; that is, how close they are to failure. This
simulation uses components from HST, which were designed with a servicing schedule
of one servicing mission every 3.5 years. A reasonable strategy is to replace compo-
nents pre-emptively when they reach the middle of their expected lives. Therefore,
this case study sets the component replacement time to 2 years.
5.2.3 Cost Model Parameters
Fabrication Costs (fab fraction)
This parameter specifies the fraction of the telescope initial cost that is spent on
fabrication. To estimate this parameter, one can consider several past missions where
a spacecraft designed for one mission was copied for another mission. These mission
pairs include:
• Cluster I / Cluster II
• Mars Polar Lander / Phoenix
• Mars Express / Venus Express
By nearly copying the spacecraft design, most of the costs incurred in during
system definition of the first mission were not repeated in the second. In addition,
there were also savings in the construction and testing phase of the second mission
compared to the first [70]. Based on this past experience, an estimated fabrication
fraction of 60% is used in this case study.
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Learning Effects (learn curve)
This parameter sets the amount of benefits from learning incurred during construction
of the second telescope in the Replacement case. Estimates for the learning effect in
the aerospace industry range from 85% [71] to 95% [64]. This means the construction
cost of the replacement telescope would be 85% to 95% of the cost to construct the
first telescope. Since the replacement is constructed at least several years after the
first telescope, learning effects would be lower than for normal aerospace projects,
because knowledge accumulated during the construction of the first telescope would
diminish over time. This case study uses 95%, which represents lower learning effect
savings.
Cost of Serviceability (serviceable inc)
This parameter specifies the cost increase incurred to include serviceability in a tele-
scope design. The parameter is difficult to estimate because it is highly design-specific.
The single source of information available on this topic was a discussion with a NASA
engineer who worked on HST development. He recalled an experience where program
managers considered removing serviceability from HST in order to cut costs. The pos-
sible savings would have been about $300M, which was 15% of the program budget of
$2B at the time. As an approximation, the cost increase to incorporate serviceability
was set to 1.15 for this case study.
Component Costs (cost replace)
The cost of replacing components on HST ranged from $1.3M for a Rate Sensing
Unit to more than $12M for a Fine Guidance Sensor [59]. For this case study, the
component replacement cost is set at a constant $5M per component.
5.2.4 Risk Parameters
Launch Failure Risk (risk launch fail)
This parameter is the probability that a launch vehicle failure occurs during the Re-
placement case. The US launch vehicle failure rates was 6.5% from 1984 to 1992 [72],
108
and the five-year average launch vehicle failure rate has ranged between 5% to 9%
[73], although the failure rates were highest in the 1960’s during the experimental
stages of US spaceflight [74]. This case study uses a launch vehicle failure probability
of 7%, in the mid-range of the historical average.
Servicing Failure Risk (risk service fail)
This parameter is the probability that a servicing mission fails to upgrade and/or
repair the telescope, but does not damage the telescope. A servicing mission can fail
either during launch or during the operations phase, so the probability must be at
least equal to the launch failure risk. This case study uses an estimated servicing
failure risk of an even 10%.
Catastrophic Servicing Failure Risk (risk cat fail)
This parameter is the probability that the servicing spacecraft disables the telescope,
which is estimated in this case study to be 2%.
5.2.5 Parameter Specification Summary
The simulation parameters were set using representative data or best estimates, which
are summarized in Table 5.3. Now that the parameters are fully specified, the simu-
lation can be executed to determine the benefits and costs of serviceability.
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Table 5.3: Parameter Settings for the Case Study
Program Parameters
drymass Telescope Size 11,000 kg
max life Nominal mission duration 15 yrs
Decision Rule Parameters
min pfo Minimum PFO below which a mission is sent 50%
future rel yrs Number of years into future to look forward in PFO
calculations (Servicing case / Replacement case)
1.5 / 2.5 yrs
serv latency Latency in servicing mission execution 1 yr
replace latency Latency in replacement mission execution 2 yrs
upgrade latency Instrument construction lead time 1 yr
no service period Time before nominal mission end when no servicing
is performed
0 yrs
min upgrade time Minimum operating time before an instrument can
be upgraded
2 yrs
min replace time Minimum operating time before components can be
pre-emptively replaced
1 yr
Risk Probabilities
risk launch fail Risk of launch failure (Replacement case only) 7%
risk service fail Risk of servicing mission failure (Servicing case only) 10%
risk cat fail Risk of catastrophic failure (Servicing case only) 2%
Cost Parameters
learn curve Learning effect percentage 95%
fab fraction Fraction of total initial cost spent on fabrication 60%
serviceable inc Fractional cost increase to incorporate serviceability 1.15
cost replace Cost of each replacement component $5M
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5.3 Rolling the Dice: Program Analysis
The simulation is now ready to analyze the value of serviceability for the telescope
specified in Section 5.1. The analysis consists of executing the simulation for each
of the four case / subcase combinations, as described in Section 4.6. This section
will show the analysis of a Replacement case with one replacement telescope and
a Servicing case with two servicing missions. For the Fixed-Schedule subcases, the
missions will be equally spaced throughout the 15-year mission duration. The cases
and subcases are summarized in Table 5.4. The simulation results will be expressed
in the primary and secondary metrics as described in Section 4.6 for each of the four
case / subcase combinations.
Table 5.4: Cases and subcases to be analyzed
Case Subcase Max Missions Mission Schedule
Replacement As-Needed 1 N/A
Replacement Fixed-Schedule 1 At Year 7.5
Servicing As-Needed 2 N/A
Servicing Fixed-Schedule 2 Every 5 Years
In addition to these programmatic parameters, the simulation itself requires a time
step for the decision model; that is, the length of time that each decision and chance
node in the decision rule analysis reprsents. This controls how often the telescope
program will be evaluated to determine if a mission should be sent. This case study
uses a time step of one month (1/12 years).
5.3.1 Step 1: Replacement Case Analysis
The primary metrics for the Fixed-Schedule replacement subcase are shown in Fig-
ure 5-3. The primary metrics for the As-Needed replacement subcase are shown in
Figure 5-4.
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Figure 5-3: Primary metrics for the Fixed-Schedule replacement subcase
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Figure 5-4: Primary metrics for the As-Needed replacement subcase
The mean lifecycle cost of each subcase is roughly the same, although the cost
distribution for the Fixed-Schedule subcase is slightly skewed towards the more ex-
pensive side. However, the Fixed-Schedule subcase has a much higher science return
(mean CSO of 440) than the As-Needed subcase (mean CSO of 315). Why is this
true? Replacing the telescope at a fixed time of 7.5 years results in better performance
because the replacement is launched much later than if the schedule were flexible, so
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the instruments installed onboard are more advanced. However, this strategy may
require the telescope to be oﬄine for a considerable portion of its life. Figure 5-5
shows the distribution of the failure time of the initial telescope.
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Figure 5-5: Failure time of the initial telescope
Most of the time, the initial telescope fails before 7.5 years, so if the telescope
is replaced as needed rather than on a fixed schedule, it will be replaced earlier.
Replacing the telescope sooner will result in a less-advanced instrument installed
onboard, so the overall science return of the program is reduced. Effectively, this
means that it is better to wait to launch a replacement, since by waiting longer, the
replacement telescope will receive significantly better instrument technology. As a
result, the program (including both telescopes) will have an increased science return
over its life.
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Figure 5-6: Program Lifetime for both Replacement subcases
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Figure 5-7: Oﬄine Time for both Replacement subcases
It appears that the Fixed-Schedule subcase is preferable under the conditions of
this case study; however, an examination of the secondary metrics may illustrate any
possible downsides to this strategy. Figure 5-6 shows the program lifetime distribu-
tions for both subcases. Again, the Fixed-Schedule subcase has a more favourable
distribution: the mean is higher, and the distribution is skewed towards a longer pro-
gram lifetime. However, the fixed schedule strategy has the potential for long periods
114
of time where there is no telescope in operation. Figure 5-7 shows the distributions
of oﬄine time for both subcases. In the As-Needed subcase, the maximum oﬄine
time is 2 years, which corresponds to the telescope construction time. The worst-
case scenario is that a telescope fails, and managers immediately make a decision to
construct the replacement, which will take 2 years. In contrast, the Fixed-Schedule
subcase can have oﬄine times that are much longer, because no matter when the
first telescope fails, its replacement is sent at a fixed time. For example, if the initial
telescope fails after two years, there will be no operational telescope for 5.5 years,
until its replacement is launched in year 7.5.
This represents the downside to the Fixed-Schedule approach: although the second
telescope is launched later and benefits from improved technology, there may be long
periods where no science data is being gathered. Indeed, scientists may be willing to
sacrifice some science return if it would decrease the likelihood that science operations
would be suspended for long durations. The trade between science return and oﬄine
time is outside the scope of this simulation, and it must be resolved in discussions
between designers and scientists. A major benefit of this simulation framework is
that it provides quantitative data to assist this discussion.
This section detailed the results from Step 1 of the simulation. These results will
be used as the baseline program against which the Servicing case will be compared
to determinine the value of serviceability. The next section discusses the simulation
results for the Servicing case.
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5.3.2 Step 2: Servicing Case Analysis
The primary metrics for the Fixed-Schedule servicing subcase are shown in Figure 5-8,
and the primary metrics for the As-Needed servicing subcase are shown in Figure 5-9.
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Figure 5-8: Primary metrics for the Servicing Case / Fixed-Schedule subcase
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Figure 5-9: Primary metrics for the Servicing Case / As-Needed subcase
The science return of the telescope program is much higher if the telescope is
serviced on failure (in the As-Needed subcase) rather than on a fixed schedule of
every 5 years. As shown previously in Figure 5-5, there is a strong possibility that
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the telescope will last past five years without servicing; in fact, it may last up to 8.5
years. If a servicing mission can be held off until later years, then the telescope will be
equipped with much more advanced technology than if it were serviced as scheduled
5 years into the program. This is similar to how the Fixed-Schedule replacement
subcase provided better science return: it was the subcase that delayed the second
mission long enough to tap the benefits of more advanced technology.
The secondary metrics for the Servicing case were also computed. Figure 5-10
shows the program lifetime for the two servicing subcases. The As-Needed subcase
has a higher mean program lifetime than the Fixed-Schedule subcase2. However,
when the telescope is serviced as-needed, there is a higher expected length of time
that the telescope will be oﬄine, as shown in Figure 5-11, which is the opposite result
than in the Replacement case. The Servicing case analyzed has two missions (once
every 5 years), rather than one replacement mission (once every 7.5 years). With
the telescope model and components specified earlier, the telescope is likely to fail
in about five to six years, so servicing on a fixed schedule every five years seems to
prevent telescope from failing and going oﬄine. In contrast, servicing as-needed often
means missions are sent once the telescope has failed, so the telescope has a greater
chance of being oﬄine longer.
2This also accounts for the slightly higher lifecycle cost of the As-Needed subcase, since telescopes
that operate for longer incur more operations costs
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Figure 5-10: End of Life (EOL) for both Servicing subcases
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Figure 5-11: Time oﬄine for both Servicing subcases
5.3.3 Step 3: Program Comparison
With the above data for each of the cases and subcases, we can determine the value of
servicing as described in Chapter 4 by analyzing the marginal gain in benefits (science
return) and the difference in costs under a fixed budget. The Replacement Case is
the baseline for comparison, but there are two Replacement subcases from which to
choose. If the subcase with better properties is chosen (higher science return, lower
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cost), the comparison will result in a conservative estimate for the value of servicing.
The simulation demonstrated that the two Replacement subcases are relatively equal
in lifecycle cost, but the Fixed-Schedule subcase has a higher science return. Thus the
baseline cost and science return is set to the values for the Fixed-Schedule Replacement
subcase.
To perform the comparison, we start with the benefits (science return). Table 5.5
shows the science return for each servicing subcase, as a mean plus or minus one
standard deviation, compared to the baseline. The results show that science return
is, on average, approximately doubled by servicing on a fixed schedule and increased
by a factor of 2.5 by servicing as needed.
Table 5.5: Science return of the Servicing subcases compared to baseline
Baseline Fixed-Schedule As-Needed
Science Return 439± 178 826± 523 1112± 834
Mean Increase - 1.95 2.53
Next, the program costs between the servicing subcase and baseline must be com-
pared. The total cost of the baseline ($6141M) represents the fixed budget for the
program. Table 5.6 shows the budget alongside the lifecycle cost for each Servicing
subcase. Remember that these lifecycle costs include all costs except for the cost
of servicing. The difference between the Servicing lifecycle cost and the baseline
budget is the remaining budget, which is the amount of the budget that is available
to spend on servicing missions, as discussed in Section 4.6. The cost of two servicing
missions must be less than or equal to the remaining budget, thus the cost of each
servicing mission must be at most half of the remaining budget.
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Table 5.6: Total cost of the Servicing subcases compared to baseline
Baseline Fixed-Schedule As-Needed
Lifecycle Cost ($M) 6141± 153 5132± 270 5198± 834
Mean Remaining Budget ($M) - 1009 943
Max Servicing Cost ($M) - 505 472
This maximum servicing cost represents the highest price that the program man-
ager would be willing to pay for each servicing mission. If a contractor states a price
that is below or equal to the servicing cost, then servicing can be performed within
budget. In this case, the telescope should be designed with the ability to be serviced
so it can take advantage of the increased science return that servicing provides. On
the other hand, if the quoted mission price is higher than the maximum allowable
servicing cost, one of the following two conclusions can be drawn:
1. Performing the two servicing missions cannot be undertaken within budget, so
telescope serviceability is not valuable, or
2. The budget should be increased in order to take advantage of servicing.
This analysis can be performed for different maximum numbers of servicing mis-
sions to see its effect on both science return and maximum servicing cost. Table 5.7
summarizes the benefits and costs of a telescope program where between one and
three servicing missions are sent as needed, with the same baseline for comparison
(Fixed-Schedule replacement).
The max servicing cost quantities in the last row can be interpreted as before.
Consider if a contract states that servicing missions can be completed for $300M.
Based on the simulation results, up to two servicing missions can be performed within
budget, but three missions cannot because the maximum allowable cost per mission
is lower than the quoted price.
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Table 5.7: Summary of results for different numbers of As-Needed servicing missions
1 Mission 2 Missions 3 Missions
Science Return 223± 128 1112± 834 1962± 1330
Lifecycle Cost ($M) 4730± 203 5198± 270 5474± 239
Remaining Budget ($M) 1411 943 659
Mean Science Increase 0.51 2.53 3.22
Max Servicing Cost ($M) 1411 472 220
However, performing three servicing missions is very appealing since science return
is increased by a factor of 3.22 relative to the baseline. If one wanted to perform three
missions, the overall program budget must be increased by $240M (3 × the $80M
shortfall per mission). This represents a 4% budget increase over the baseline budget
of $6141M.
5.3.4 Program Analysis Summary
The simulation investigated the two telescope program cases with HST-based tele-
scope model and parameter settings in order to determine the value of serviceability.
The results showed that the two Servicing subcases were relatively equal in cost,
but the As-Needed subcase had much higher science return than the Fixed-Schedule
subcase for two or more servicing missions.
This data can be given to program managers who must decide whether or not
to include serviceability in design. With this data, managers would solicit quotes
for the price of servicing missions by external contractors. If the quoted price is
below the maximum cost, then serviceability can be included within the specified
budget. Otherwise, the program managers would know how the budget increase
needed to pay for the missions, and the benefit that would be realized if that increase
is authorized. The data provided by the simulation provide a more rigorous (and
compelling) argument for why serviceability should be incorporated into a design.
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5.4 Turning the Knobs: Sensitivity Analysis
The previous section detailed the results of the simulation that used a particular set
of values for the parameters described in Section 5.2. Sensitivity analysis can shed
some light on the effect of varying these parameters on the results of the simulation,
which are referred to in this section as the nominal results. This section will detail
the results of sensitivity analyses on selected parameters for demonstrative purposes.
Results of the sensitivity analysis will be displayed in box plots, the legend for which
is shown in Figure 5-12. If the simulation were used during an actual design study, a
much larger set of parameters would be examined through sensitivity analysis.
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Figure 5-12: Legend for sensitivity analysis boxplots
The sensitivity analyses will be performed using the Fixed-Schedule replacement
subcase as the baseline program, and the As-Needed servicing subcase as the nom-
inal servicing program. The nominal servicing program results are summarized in
Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Summary of nominal simulation results
Case/Subcase # Missions Science Return Lifecycle Cost Max Servicing Cost
As-Needed
Servicing
2 1112 $5198M $472M
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5.4.1 Sensitivity to PFO Threshold (min pfo)
The PFO threshold controls when servicing or replacement missions are sent. Modify-
ing this parameter changes the reliability threshold below which the program manager
will decide to send a mission. Decreasing the parameter causes the manager to wait
longer until the telescope is closer to failure, which effectively delays the mission.
Conversely, increasing the parameter causes the manager to be more proactive and
send missions far in advance of when the telescope is expected to fail. Figure 5-13
shows how the science return and the oﬄine time of the telescope are affected as
min pfo ranges from 30% to 70%.
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Figure 5-13: Sensitivity of results to changes in min pfo
As the parameter decreases, the science return of the telescope increases dramat-
ically (from 719 when min pfo = 0.7 to 1332 when min pfo = 0.3). Decreasing the
parameter pushes the servicing or replacement mission further into the future, so by
the time the mission is finally executed, more advanced instrument technology is in-
stalled on the telescope. However, by waiting longer to send the mission, it becomes
more likely that the telescope will fail before the mission can be executed. Therefore,
the expected oﬄine time increases when managers wait longer to make the decision
to service or replace.
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5.4.2 Sensitivity to Number of Components
One of the main tasks of servicing missions is to replace components that have failed.
If the number of backup components onboard is increased, the telescope can operate
longer without servicing, so servicing missions can occur later in the life of the tele-
scope. Figure 5-14 shows the distribution of when the first servicing mission is sent
for both the nominal telescope design and when the telescope design includes one
extra backup component for each component set. Clearly, when additional backup
components are installed, the telescope lasts longer.
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Figure 5-14: As-Needed servicing mission times as number of backups is increased
The previous sensitivity analysis demonstrated that delaying the servicing mis-
sions increases science return since new instruments that are eventually installed
onboard are more advanced. This effect is also apparent when the number of backup
components increases. Figure 5-15 shows the distribution of science return for both
the nominal and extra-backup designs. The science return is markedly increased when
more backups are installed.
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Figure 5-15: Increase in science return when number of backups is increased
Figure 5-16 shows the distribution of lifecycle cost for both the nominal and extra-
backup designs. The lifecycle cost of the program marginally increases when extra
backups are installed since the telescope life is longer (higher operating expenses)
and the cost of additional components. The mean lifecycle cost increased from the
baseline of $5198M to $5434M when extra backups were included. In practice, it is
often difficult to include extra backups due to restrictions on mass, cost, or complexity.
However, this sensitivity analysis has demonstrated that it can be worthwhile.
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Figure 5-16: Increase in lifecycle cost when number of backups is increased
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5.4.3 Sensitivity to Servicing Latency (serv latency)
The servicing latency is the time required to prepare a servicing mission once the
decision is made to send one. Modifying this parameter changes the period of time
between the decision to service and the execution of the servicing mission. Figure 5-
17 shows how the science return and the oﬄine time of the telescope are affected as
serv latency ranges from 0.5 years to 2 years.
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Figure 5-17: Sensitivity of results to changes in serv latency
Similar to the min pfo parameter in Section 5.4.1, as the serv latency parameter
increases, the science return of the telescope increases as well (from a mean of 870
when serv latency = 0.5 to a mean of 2120 when serv latency = 2.0). With
longer servicing latency, the servicing mission requires more time to construct, so
by the time it is executed, more advanced technology is installed on the telescope.
Note this should be taken as a side-effect of a long construction time: one would
not purposefully extend the construction time to gain these benefits. Furthermore,
by waiting longer to send the mission, the telescope is more likely to fail before the
mission can be executed. Also, a longer latency means that it takes longer to send
the mission, so the telescope is more likely to fail in the interim. Thus, the expected
oﬄine time also increases.
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5.4.4 Sensitivity to Technology Advancement
The discovery efficiency of state-of-the-art instrument technology is controlled by
a exponential rate parameter p as described in Section 4.1.4. Increasing this rate
parameter will increase the rate of technology advancement. Figure 5-18 shows the
effect of increasing and decreasing p by 10% from its nominal value of p = 0.3218 in
this case study.
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Figure 5-18: Sensitivity to changes in technology advancement rate p
Changing the exponential rate parameter had a considerable impact on the instru-
ment discovery efficiency: At year ten, technology developed at a rate of p = 0.354
has approximately doubled the discovery efficiency of technology developed at a rate
of p = 0.297. As technology advances more rapidly, any instrument installed on the
telescope will be more advanced as well, which increases the overall science return of
the telescope program. As an example, when the parameter was increased by 10%,
the science return increased from a mean of 1112 to 1490.
Clearly, serviceability is more valuable when the technology that is installed dur-
ing servicing advances rapidly. This can both justify including serviceability in a
telescope and identify technologies that should be selected as candidates for upgrades
via servicing.
127
5.4.5 Sensitivity to Fabrication Fraction (fab fraction)
The cost of the replacement telescope is a specified fraction of the cost of the initial
telescope. This parameter is critical to the maximum servicing cost because the cost
of the Replacement program dictates the baseline budget for any Servicing program.
As fab fraction increases, the replacement telescope becomes more expensive. This
increases the baseline budget, which increases the remaining budget available to pay
for servicing missions. This in turn increases the maximum price that managers are
willing to pay for each servicing mission.
Figure 5-19 shows how the lifecycle cost of the Replacement program changes
as fab fraction varies from 0.4 to 0.8. This represents the baseline budget for
different parameter settings. From before, the mean lifecycle cost of the Servicing
case (excluding servicing missions) was $5198M. The difference between this and the
budget is the amount remaining that can be paid for servicing.
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Figure 5-19: Sensitivity of budget to changes in fab fraction
As the budget increases, the maximum servicing cost increases as well, where the
cost is half of the remaining budget (since there are two servicing missions in the
nominal case). Figure 5-20 shows the how the maximum servicing cost increases as
the fabrication fraction increases.
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Figure 5-20: Sensitivity of max servicing cost to changes in fab fraction
5.4.6 Sensitivity to Servicing Failure Risk (serv risk fail)
The servicing failure risk is the probability that the servicing mission will fail to
repair and/or upgrade the telescope. Figure 5-21 shows how the science return of the
telescope is affected as serv risk fail ranges from 2% to 20%.
0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Servicing Failure Risk
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 S
cie
nc
e 
O
ut
pu
t
Figure 5-21: Sensitivity of science return to changes in risk serv fail
The science return is drastically reduced as the servicing failure risk increases
because the servicing mission is more likely to fail to upgrade the science instrument.
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Figure 5-22: Sensitivity of results to changes in risk serv fail
If this occurs, the telescope is stuck with the old instrument with a much lower
discovery efficiency, so the overall science return of the telescope is lower than if the
upgrade was successful.
Figure 5-22 shows the sensitivity of selected secondary metrics to the servicing
failure risk. As the servicing failure risk increases, the program lifetime decreases.
Without successful servicing missions, components that have failed are not replaced,
and eventually so many components fail that the telescope shuts down permanently.
The oﬄine time is not significantly affected by the servicing failure risk, because a
failure to service will often result in the end of a mission, rather than additional time
waiting for a second servicing mission.
5.4.7 Sensitivity to Serviceability Cost (serviceable inc)
The cost of adding serviceability to a telescope is represented as a fractional increase of
initial telescope cost. Just as the fabrication fraction parameter discussed above, this
parameter dramatically affects the maximum servicing cost. As serviceable inc
increases, the serviceable telescope becomes more expensive, and there are less funds
available to pay for servicing missions (under a fixed budget), which decreases the
maximum price that can be paid.
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Figure 5-23 shows how the lifecycle cost of the Servicing program (not including
the cost of servicing itself) changes as serviceable inc varies from 1.05 to 1.25.
The data points represent the lifecycle cost for each value of serviceable inc. The
fixed budget was set at $6141M, which was the lifecycle cost of the Fixed-Schedule
replacement subcase in the nominal results.
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Figure 5-23: Sensitivity of budget to changes in serviceable inc
The difference between the budget and the program lifecycle cost is the remaining
budget that can be used to pay for servicing missions. Figure 5-24 shows the how the
maximum servicing cost changes as the serviceability cost increases. As before, the
maximum servicing cost is half of the remaining budget.
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Figure 5-24: Sensitivity of max servicing cost to changes in serviceable inc
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5.4.8 Sensitivity Analysis Summary
The sensitivity analysis presented in this section demonstrated the effect of changing
parameters from their values in the nominal As-Needed Servicing strategy, summa-
rized in Table 5.8. For example, increasing the number of backups or the technology
advancement rate increased the science return of the program, which is not surpris-
ing. The sensitivity analysis confirmed our intuition and quantified exactly how the
parameters affect the results.
In addition, the sensitivity analysis showed effects that were not immediately
obvious. For example, increasing the servicing latency also increased the science
return, because this pushed servicing missions further into the future and caused more
advanced instrument technology to be installed. The analysis also further investigated
the effects of parameters on oﬄine time, which was identified as important by the
simulation results. Clearly, sensitivity analysis can provide valuable insights into the
value of serviceability and give managers a better perspective on the outcome of the
simulation.
5.5 Case Study Summary
This chapter has illustrated how the simulation framework can be used to analyze
the value of serviceability through the use of a case study. The case study was an
execution of the simulation using representative data and a simplified telescope model.
If this framework were used in an actual telescope project, the simulation would be
populated with more accurate data and a more complete telescope model. As well, a
more extensive sensitivity analysis would be conducted.
This case study demonstrated how the value of serviceability can be quantitatively
determined using this simulation framework. In Chapter 2, value was defined as
benefit at cost. This simulation can compute the benefit (increase in science return)
of servicing compared to replacement. Also, the simulation determines the maximum
cost of servicing given a fixed budget. A sensitivity analysis can be performed to
investigate the effect of simulation parameters on the primary and secondary metrics.
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Additionally, this case study provided some important insights. Most significantly,
a delay in the servicing or replacement missions, for whatever reason, increases the
overall science return of the program, since the instruments installed on the telescope
are more advanced. However, this comes at the cost of increasing the time that the
telescope is inoperative due to failures. Thus, there is a trade between increasing the
telescope science return and minimizing the time oﬄine, which should be addressed
by consulting scientists and others who would use the telescope.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
History has shown that although on-orbit servicing is perceived to be valuable, the
ability to perform servicing (serviceability) has often been removed from spacecraft
designs in the face of budget and scheduling constraints. This is particularly true of
space telescope programs. Program managers have often made those decisions with-
out a full, quantitative account of the value of serviceability. This thesis developed
a framework that can be used to determine the value of incorporating serviceability
into a space telescope. The framework was then implemented using a set of MATLAB
functions to demonstrate how it can be used to analyze the value of serviceability.
The framework is ready to be used in the future for real telescope design projects,
where it can be implemented using company-specific knowledge and numerical codes
to provide more accurate and program-specific estimates of value.
6.1 Questions Answered
The goal of the thesis was to develop a framework to analyze the value of serviceability.
In order to do so, the framework had to address three specific questions, laid out in
Chapter 2. This section will repeat those three questions and discuss how, and to
what extent, they were answered throughout this thesis.
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Research Question 1
How can the costs and benefits of telescope servicing be compared to
determine the value of serviceability?
Answer: A major difficulty in determining the value of serviceability was that the
costs and benefits of a space telescope are measured in different units, so they cannot
be directly evaluated together in a single metric of value. This issue was resolved
by using program comparison. Two separate cases were developed: one where the
telescope is replaced on failure (the Replacement case), and one where the telescope
is serviced on failure (the Servicing case). The baseline used to compare the two cases
is a fixed budget, which was taken as the lifecycle cost of the Replacement case. This
allowed the increase in science return from the Replacement case to the Servicing
case to be calculated, along with the maximum price that could be paid for servicing
missions to achieve this increase in science return.
Research Question 2
How can the incorporation of serviceability in a telescope be justified?
Answer: Telescope serviceability can be justified if the science return of the pro-
gram is increased compared to the case where a non-serviceable telescope is replaced.
This is evaluated under a fixed budget, as discussed above. In order to evaluate this
statement, this thesis developed a simulation framework that can be used to determine
the expected science return and lifecycle costs (and hence the value) of serviceability.
This thesis also presented a case study to demonstrate how the framework can be
used in this manner.
Research Question 3
How can the value of flexibility provided by servicing be analyzed?
Answer: Servicing provides the flexibility to make decisions in the future as
uncertainty is resolved. This is simulated by using a decision rule model that evaluates
when to perform servicing or replacement missions by using a pre-defined set of rules.
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The rules are expressed as if/else statements based on a set of parameters that can
be tuned to represent the decision criteria of a program manager. As well, a Monte-
Carlo analysis is performed to average out the effects of all the uncertain elements
in a telescope program. The simulation is executed many times and the results are
expressed as probability distributions. These distributions represent the full range of
the performance of the telescope program.
The case study has demonstrated that the cost of serviceability is a significant
driver of its value. If enabling servicing on a telescope is cost prohibitive, it is unlikely
to be valuable, since other alternatives may be more attractive. Other variables that
contribute to the value of serviceability include the rate of technology advancement,
the amount of backups installed onboard, probabilities of chance events associated
with servicing, the thresholds in program decision rules, and the cost of telescope
replacement (which is the alternative to servicing).
A major new insight from these analyses is the correlation between increasing
science return and increasing oﬄine time when servicing missions are delayed. When
missions are pushed further into the future, the science instrument installed on the
telescope is more advanced, but this comes at the risk of longer periods where the
telescope is oﬄine due to component failures. Scientists may be willing to reduce the
expected science return of the telescope in order to protect against this risk. This
motivates a trade between increasing the science return of the overall program and
ensuring the telescope remains operational (i.e. not oﬄine) throughout its life.
6.2 Future Work
The framework provides a solid foundation for analysis of servicing within telescope
programs, but the framework is constructed under several assumptions and modelling
decisions. The foundation can be strengthened, and the results more broadly appli-
cable, if further work and research is applied to this framework.
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Effect of Component Lifetimes
The failure rate information that was used in the case study was from the compo-
nents used on the HST. These were designed with the expectation that HST would
be serviced every three years. However, if the interval between servicing missions was
prolonged, the components would probably have been designed to last longer. This
illustrates a trade study that was not incorporated into the framework: the effect of
component lifetime on the value of servicing. Realistically, if the servicing schedule
is changed, the component lifetime should also be changed accordingly. This was not
addressed in the thesis due to a lack of data, as the HST component information
was the only data that was found. The effect of component lifetimes is certainly an
important avenue to explore.
Trade Between Science Return and Uninterrupted Operations
As discussed in the previous section, there is an important trade between increased
science return and less risk of downtime due to failures. To address this trade, one
requires the priorities of scientists that would use the telescope data and a method to
gauge their tolerance of mission downtime for the benefits of improved science return.
Different Baseline Cases
There were two main strategies (cases) that were investigated in this thesis: one
where the telescope is replaced (the Replacement case), and one where the telescope
is regularly serviced (the Servicing case). The baseline used to determine the value
of servicing was the Replacement case, but in doing so it precluded the strategy of
designing a single telescope to last for the entire mission duration. This was justified
for the case of a long-duration, large telescope, which is impractical to design for
such a long life, but there are other cases where neither replacement nor servicing
are appropriate, particularly for smaller, shorter duration missions. If other baseline
strategies are considered, the framework can be used in more situations.
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Generalize to Other Non-Revenue Generating Systems
The framework analyzed the value of serviceability in the specific case of space tele-
scopes. The framework used several techniques to avoid the issue of different units
for benefits and costs, to account for decision-making by program managers, and to
incorporate the value of flexibility. These techniques are generally applicable to any
spacecraft that does not have monetary benefits, which constitutes a large fraction
of the current spacecraft fleet in orbit, such as Earth observation satellites, space-
craft that carry science experiments, defence and military systems, and deep space
communications arrays.
In each of these cases, the benefits generated by the system are measured differ-
ently, but in order to determine the value of serviceability for these programs, issues
similar to those for space telescopes must be addressed. It is therefore likely that the
framework can be extended for more general non-revenue generating spacecraft.
6.3 Final Thoughts
The Hubble Space Telescope is one of the most productive astronomical instruments in
history. It has provided tremendous insights into the universe, expanded the frontiers
of scientific knowledge, and captured the imagination of the public unlike any other
telescope before. Servicing played an integral part in the success of the HST program,
which in turn has renewed interest in the value of on-orbit servicing. It is the author’s
hope that research into both the how and why of servicing continues, so that servicing
is more widely used in future space programs, and the opportunities that servicing
provides can be fully realized.
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Appendix A
Simulation Code
The simulation was implemented as a set of MATLAB functions and scripts. The core
of the simulation is a set of functions called the kernel. The kernel is comprised of two
functions that simulate telescope programs through time: telescopeSim Replace()
for the Replacement case and telescopeSim Service() for the Servicing case.
Executing these functions will perform one run of the simulation. To perform the
Monte-Carlo analysis, these functions must be executed many times, which are done
using the iterateReplace() and iterateService() scripts. Sensitivity analysis
was performed using the sensitivity() script.
The kernel calls other functions during the simulation to model the performance
of the telescope through time. The performance models include models for random
events, telescope state updates, and the advancement of technology.
After a simulation has completed, the cost analysis is performed. The lifecy-
cle costs are computed by costAnalysis Replace() for the Replacement case and
costAnalysis Service() for the Servicing case. Both of these functions call other
models for specific program costs, such as inital costs, instrument costs, etc.
The functions and scripts in the simulation are summarized in Table A.1 and
categorized into three groups. The following three sections include the simulation
code for these groups.
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Table A.1: Summary of MATLAB modules in the simulation
Simulation Kernel
parameters Simulation parameter initialization
sensitivity Sensitivity analysis routine
compInitialize Script to intialize telescope properties
constInitialize Script to initialize simulation parameters
iterateReplace Monte-Carlo sampling for the replacement case
telescopeSim Replace Decision analysis for replacement case
iterateService Monte-Carlo sampling for the servicing case
telescopeSim Service Decision analysis for servicing case
Performance Models
computeSetReliability Computes the future reliability of a component set
createComponent Creates array to represent the component set
generalFail General component failure function
hazardGyro Hazard rate for Weibull-distributed gyroscopes
reliabilityGyro Reliability calculator for Weibull-distributed gyroscopes
utilityInstrument Instrument technology discovery efficiency
telescopeRepair Update telescope state to reflect repair operations
telescopeUpgrade Update telescope state to reflect upgrade operations
Cost Models
costAnalysis Replace Calculates the lifecycle cost of the Replacement case
costAnalysis Servicing Calculates the lifecycle cost of the Servicing case
costComponents Replacement component cost
costInitial Initial telescope cost
costLaunch Launch cost
costOps Annual operations cost
costScience Science instrument cost
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A.1 Simulation Kernel
%PARAMETERS Stores program parameters.
dt = 1/12;
num_serv = 2;
num_repl = 1;
num_iter = 1000;
% select servicing type:
% ’n’ = service as needed
% ’y’ = service at set times
fixed_schedule_service = ’n’;
% select replacement type:
% ’n’ = replace when first telescope fails
% ’y’ = replace at set times
fixed_schedule_replace = ’n’;
% turn off diagnostics
diag_flag = 0;
% turn off sensitivity analysis
% (turned back on by sensitivity.m)
sens_flag = 0;
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%SENSITIVITY Looping script to perform basic sensitivity analysis on one
% or more fixed parameters
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 3, 2006
clear
parameters
% turn on sensitivity analysis
sens_flag = 1;
% define parameter to vary for sensitivity analysis
sens_data = 0.4:0.1:0.8;
sens_name = ’fab_fraction’;
% set program type to ’replace’ or ’service’
program_type = ’replace’;
iter_count = 0;
for k=1:length(sens_data)
iter_count = iter_count + 1;
% select variable under sensitivity investigation
sens_param = sens_data(k);
% specify the program type
if strcmp(program_type,’replace’)
iterateReplace;
elseif strcmp(program_type,’service’)
iterateService;
end
% extract figures of merit for comparison
data_science_mean(k) = mean(cum_utility);
data_science_stdv(k) = std(cum_utility);
data_science(:,k) = cum_utility;
data_offline_mean(k) = mean(offline_time);
data_offline_stdv(k) = std(offline_time);
data_offline(:,k) = offline_time;
data_EOL_mean(k) = mean(EOL);
data_EOL_stdv(k) = std(EOL);
data_EOL(:,k) = EOL;
data_cost_mean(k) = mean(total_cost);
data_cost_stdv(k) = std(total_cost);
data_cost(:,k) = total_cost;
end
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%COMPINITIALIZE Script to intialize properties of telescope
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 13, 2006
% initialize all constant parameters
constInitialize;
% set operations flags
EOL_flag = 0; % flag = 1 when end-of-life occurs
operational_flag = 1; % flag = 1 when telescope is working
service_now_flag = 0; % flag = 1 when decision made to service
service_allow_flag = 0; % flag = 1 when telescope eligible for servicing
sched_flag = 0; % flag = 1 when telescope is serviced now
% initialize time counters
time_since_serv = 0;
time_since_upgrade = 0;
serv_wait_time = 0;
offline_time = 0;
% specify properties of telescope component sets
num_needed = [2 3 3 1]; % minimum number of components needed for operations
num_comp = [3 6 4 2]; % total number of components per set
num_ops = [3 4 4 2]; % number of components "on" at one time
hazard_ptr = {0.0747, @hazardGyro, 0.0327, 0.0766};
reliability_ptr = {0.0747, @reliabilityGyro, 0.0327, 0.0766};
num_set = length(num_comp);
comp_fails = zeros(1,num_set);
% initialize the output variable arrays
upgrade_times = [];
repair_times = [];
fail_times = [];
repair_set = [0 0 0 0];
utility = [10]; % initialize initial utility to normalized value of 10
% initialize component sets
for i=1:num_set
comp_set{i} = createComponent(num_comp(i));
end
% start at zero time (at initial operations)
current_period = 0;
current_time = 0;
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%CONSTINITIALIZE Script to intialize properties of telescope
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 13, 2006
% set mission lifecycle parameters (time step, max design life)
max_life = 15;
dt = 1/12;
max_period = max_life / dt;
drymass = 11000;
% set program parameters (for fixed case)
fixed_replace_time = 7.5; % time to perform replacement mission
fixed_serv_times = 3.5; % time increment between servicing missions
% set decision rule properties
min_pfo = 0.50; % minimum PFO below which the telescope is serviced
future_rel_yrs = 1.5; % reliability analysis time horizon (years)
serv_latency = 1; % latency in servicing mission (years)
replace_latency = 2; % latency in replacement mission (years)
upgrade_latency = 1; % latency in instrument construction (years)
no_service_period = 0; % servicing blackout period before EOL (years)
min_upgrade_time = 2; % minimum life before instruments are upgraded (years)
min_replace_time = 2; % minimum life before components are replaced (years)
% set risk probabilities
risk_launch_fail = 0.07; % risk of launch failure (replacement case only)
risk_service_fail = 0.10; % risk of servicing mission failure
risk_cat_fail = 0.02; % risk of catastrophic mission failure
% set cost parameters
learn_curve = 0.95; % learning curve (SMAD pg 809)
fab_fraction = 0.6; % fraction of total RDT&E cost for fabrication
serviceable_inc = 1.15; % increase in cost to make the telescope serviceable
cost_replace = 5; % cost to replace each component ($M)
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%ITERATEREPLACE Script for Monte-Carlo simulation for telescope replacement
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% October 3, 2006
constInitialize;
% preallocate output variables
start_time1 = zeros(1,num_iter);
start_time2 = zeros(1,num_iter);
util1 = zeros(1,num_iter);
util2 = zeros(1,num_iter);
offline_time = zeros(1,num_iter);
cum_utility = zeros(1,num_iter);
EOL = zeros(1,num_iter);
overlap = zeros(1,num_iter);
j = 1;
replace_wait_count = 0;
tic
for i=1:num_iter
% run simulation
[comp_fails1 pfo_curve1 fail_time(i,1)] = telescopeSim_Replace(dt);
[comp_fails2 pfo_curve2 fail_time(i,2)] = telescopeSim_Replace(dt);
% find period when the first telescope goes below PFO threshold
for q=1:length(pfo_curve1)
if pfo_curve1(q) < min_pfo
threshold_pd = q;
break
end
end
% find overall utility of first telescope
util1(i) = utilityInstrument(0) * fail_time(i,1);
if rand() > risk_launch_fail
% find launch time of second telescope
if (fixed_schedule_replace == ’y’)
start_time2(i) = fixed_replace_time;
else
start_time2(i) = threshold_pd*dt + replace_latency;
end
% find overall utility of second telescope
util2(i) = utilityInstrument(start_time2(i) - upgrade_latency) * fail_time(i,2);
% find EOL of telescope program
EOL(i) = start_time2(i) + fail_time(i,2);
% calculate secondary metrics
offline_time(j) = max(start_time2(i) - fail_time(i,1), 0);
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overlap(j) = max(fail_time(i,1) - start_time2(i), 0);
j = j+1;
else
EOL(i) = fail_time(i,1);
util2(i) = 0;
end
cum_utility(i) = util1(i) + util2(i);
% Feedback to user during simulation
if rem(i,num_iter/100) == 0
clc
disp(sprintf(’Simulation %d%% complete’,i/num_iter*100))
end
end
time = toc;
disp(sprintf(’Simulation completed in %2.1g minutes’,time/60));
% run cost analysis
total_cost = costAnalysis_Replace(drymass, EOL, fab_fraction, learn_curve, 0);
plot_type = ’replace’;
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function [comp_fails pfo_curve fail_time] = telescopeSim_Replace(dt)
%TELESCOPESIM_REPLACE Simulates the performance of a telescope over time without repair
% This function runs a probabilistic simulation of a telescope and
% determines when the telescope fails.
%
% INPUTS
%
% OUTPUTS
% comp_fails vector that denotes which components failed
% pfo_curve "Probability of Future Operations" curve over time
% fail_time period at the end of which the system fails
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 13, 2006
compInitialize;
EOL_flag = 0;
while ~EOL_flag && (current_period < max_period)
current_period = current_period + 1;
current_time = current_time + dt;
for i=1:num_set
[comp_set{i} fail_flag(i)] = generalFail(comp_set{i}, num_comp(i),...
num_ops(i), num_needed(i), dt, hazard_ptr{i});
end
% calculate reliability of each component set
for i=1:num_set
set_reliability(i) = computeSetReliability(comp_set{i}, num_comp(i),...
num_needed(i), dt, future_rel_yrs, reliability_ptr{i});
end
% compute overall system reliability and store in output
total_rel = prod(set_reliability);
pfo_curve(current_period) = total_rel;
% Check if telescope fails
if (any(fail_flag))
EOL_flag = 1;
comp_fails = fail_flag;
fail_time = current_period*dt;
end
if current_period == max_period
disp(’Hey! out of range!’)
end
end
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%ITERATESERVICE Script for Monte-Carlo simulation for telescope servicing
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 11, 2006
constInitialize;
% preallocate output variables
[upgrade_times{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
[fail_times{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
[repair_times{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
[repair_set{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
[comp_fails{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
[utility{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
[pfo_curve{1:num_iter}] = deal(0);
offline_time = zeros(1,num_iter);
cum_utility = zeros(1,num_iter);
EOL = zeros(1,num_iter);
comp_replace = zeros(1,num_iter);
num_missions = zeros(1,num_iter);
num_upgrades = zeros(1,num_iter);
first_repair = zeros(1,num_iter);
% run Monte-Carlo simulation
for i=1:num_iter
% input additional parameters if this is a sensitivity analysis
if sens_flag
[upgrade_times{i} fail_times{i} offline_time(i) repair_times{i} repair_set{i}...
comp_fails{i} utility{i} cum_utility(i) EOL(i) pfo_curve{i}] = ...
telescopeSim_Service(num_serv,dt,fixed_schedule_service,0,sens_name,sens_param);
else
[upgrade_times{i} fail_times{i} offline_time(i) repair_times{i} repair_set{i}...
comp_fails{i} utility{i} cum_utility(i) EOL(i) pfo_curve{i}] = ...
telescopeSim_Service(num_serv,dt,fixed_schedule_service,0);
end
num_missions(i) = length(repair_times{i});
num_upgrades(i) = length(upgrade_times{i});
first_repair(i) = repair_times{i}(1);
comp_replace(i) = sum(repair_set{i});
end
% run cost analysis
total_cost = costAnalysis_Servicing(drymass, serviceable_inc, EOL, num_serv,...
cost_replace, comp_replace, 0);
plot_type = ’service’;
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function [upgrade_times fail_times offline_time repair_times repair_set...
comp_fails utility cum_utility EOL pfo_curve] = ...
telescopeSim_Service(num_serv, dt, fixed_flag, diag_flag, varargin)
%TELESCOPESIM_SERVICE Simulates the performance of a serviceable telescope over time.
% This function runs a probabilistic simulation of a telescope and
% determines when the telescope is upgraded and repaired, given a maximum
% number of servicing missions over the design lifetime.
%
% INPUTS
% num_serv maximum number of servicing missions allowed
% dt time step (years)
% fixed_flag set if servicing schedule is fixed (’y’ = fixed)
% diag_flag toggle diagnostic messages (1 = messages on)
%
% VARIABLE INPUTS
% Variables for sensitivity analysis are passed into the function as pairs:
% the first is the name of the variable as a string, and the second is the
% value of the variable.
%
% OUTPUTS
% upgrade_times vector of times where upgrades were made (years)
% fail_times vector of times where failures occurred (years)
% offline_time total time that the telescope is offline (years)
% repair_times vector of times where repairs were made (years)
% repair_set vector of components repaired during the mission
% comp_fails vector that counts which components failed
% utility vector of utility of telescope instruments through time
% cum_utility cumulative science output (CSO) of telescope
% EOL time when telescope operations are terminated (year)
% pfo_curve "Probability of Future Operations" curve over time
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 31, 2006
compInitialize;
% check if varargin has even number of components
if rem(length(varargin),2) ~= 0
error(’Inputs to telescopeSim_Service has odd number of components’)
end
% store additional variables passed into function for sensitivity analysis
% (will overwrite parameter that was initialized by compInitialize)
for i=1:length(varargin)/2
expression = [varargin{2*i-1}, ’=’, num2str(varargin{2*i})];
evalc(expression);
end
% NOTE OF CAUTION: Most calculations within the loop are done using periods
% rather than years. The quantities are converted to years prior to output
while ~EOL_flag
% increment quantities by one period
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time_since_upgrade = time_since_upgrade + dt;
current_period = current_period + 1;
current_time = current_time + dt;
if ops_flag
% increment operational times of components and determine if any
% components have failed
for i=1:num_set
[comp_set{i} fail_flag(i)] = generalFail(comp_set{i}, num_comp(i),...
num_ops(i), num_needed(i), dt, hazard_ptr{i});
end
% calculate reliability of each component set
for i=1:num_set
set_reliability(i) = computeSetReliability(comp_set{i}, num_comp(i),...
num_needed(i), dt, future_rel_yrs, reliability_ptr{i});
end
end
% compute overall system reliability and store in output
total_rel = prod(set_reliability);
pfo_curve(current_period) = total_rel;
% *** DECISION ANALYSIS STARTS HERE ***
% check if the telescope is allowed to be serviced
if length(repair_times) >= num_serv
service_allow_flag = 0;
elseif current_time >= max_life
service_allow_flag = 0;
else
service_allow_flag = 1;
end
% for the fixed servicing schedule case, check if the telescope is
% scheduled to be serviced in the current period
if strcmp(fixed_flag,’y’)
servicing_periods = round(max_period*(1:num_serv)./(num_serv+1));
if (any(current_period == servicing_periods))
sched_flag = 1;
service_now_flag = 1;
else
sched_flag = 0;
end
end
% check if failure occurred and store current period if yes
if any(fail_flag)
fail_times = [fail_times current_time];
ops_flag = 0;
end
% if the telescope fails and the telescope is not to be serviced,
% signal termination of operations (EOL)
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if (any(fail_flag) && ~service_allow_flag)
EOL_flag = 1;
EOL = current_period * dt;
break
% perform servicing if you are required to service now AND the
% servicing spacecraft is ready
elseif service_now_flag && (serv_wait_time >= serv_latency || sched_flag)
% DIAGNOSTIC TEXT
if diag_flag
disp(sprintf(’Servicing now: time %2.2f’,current_time))
end
% store current period as a repair time and add the components that
% have failed to the "comp_fails" cumulative vector
repair_times = [repair_times current_time];
comp_fails = comp_fails + fail_flag;
% check if a catastrophic failure occurs, in which case signal EOL
if (rand() < risk_cat_fail)
% DIAGNOSTIC TEXT
if diag_flag
disp(sprintf(’WARNING: Catastrophic failure: time %2.2f’,current_time))
end
EOL_flag = 1;
EOL = current_period * dt;
break
end
% check if the repair mission fails, thus the components are not
% modified and the utility of the spacecraft is zero
if (rand() < risk_service_fail)
% DIAGNOSTIC TEXT
if diag_flag
disp(sprintf(’WARNING: Servicing failure: time %2.2f’,current_time))
end
% maintain same utility as last period
utility = [utility utility(length(utility))];
serv_wait_time = 0;
service_now_flag = 1;
else
% repair components as needed
[comp_set repair_set] = telescopeRepair(comp_set, repair_set, num_set,...
num_comp, min_replace_time, diag_flag);
% set flags to signify operational status & no need to service
ops_flag = 1;
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service_now_flag = 0;
% reset the servicing waiting time counter
serv_wait_time = 0;
% The telescope will be upgraded if it has been at least
% "min_upgrade_time" since the last upgrade
if (time_since_upgrade >= min_upgrade_time)
% perform upgrade operations and reset upgrade timer
[upgrade_times utility] = telescopeUpgrade(upgrade_times, utility,...
current_time, dt, upgrade_latency);
time_since_upgrade = 0;
else
utility = [utility utility(length(utility))];
end
end
% DIAGNOSTIC TEXT
if diag_flag
disp(sprintf(’---------------------------------------’))
disp(sprintf(’ ’))
end
% Set servicing flag if either there was a failure OR the telescope is
% unreliable OR the telescope is inoperative
elseif service_allow_flag && (any(fail_flag) || any(total_rel < min_pfo) || ~ops_flag)
service_now_flag = 1;
serv_wait_time = serv_wait_time + dt;
utility = [utility utility(length(utility))];
else
ops_flag = 1;
utility = [utility utility(length(utility))];
end
% if the telescope is inoperative, set the curret utility of the
% telescope (the last entry in the "utility" vector") to zero.
if ~ops_flag
utility(length(utility)) = 0;
offline_time = offline_time + dt;
end
% ERROR CHECKING STEP: stop on "infinite loop"
if current_time == 3*max_life
error(’Program stopped: infinite loop detected’)
end
end
% compute cumulative utility over telescope life (Riemann sum)
cum_utility = sum(utility) * dt;
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A.2 Performance Models
function total_rel = ...
computeSetReliability(comp_set, num_comp, num_needed, dt, num_years, rel_fcn)
%COMPUTESETRELIABILITY Determines the overall reliability of a component set
% Computes the reliability of a set of components where
% determines when the telescope fails.
%
% INPUTS
% comp_set matrix describing the component set
% num_comp number of components in the set
% num_needed number of working components needed for operations
% num_years years to look forward into the future for reliability
% dt length of period expressed in years
% rel_fcn function that computes the reliability of the component
%
% OUTPUTS
% total_rel overall current reliability of component set
%
% VERIFICATION
% Tested using the standard "R out of N" combinatorial formula (applicable
% only for identical elements) and hand calculations.
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 24, 2006
% Step 1: Generate all possible combinations of operational components
% (N choose K, where N is # of components and K is # required to operate)
N = [];
for i=num_needed:num_comp
% add rows for (num_comp choose i) combinations
N = [N; nchoosek(1:num_comp,i) zeros(nchoosek(num_comp,i),num_comp-i)];
end
% Step 2: Generate a matrix comp_status where 1’s represent failed
% components, and 0’s represent working components
[row col] = size(N);
comp_status = ones(row,col);
for i=1:row
for j=1:col
if N(i,j)
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comp_status(i,N(i,j)) = 0;
end
end
end
% Step 3: Determine reliability vector "comp_reliability" by evaluating the
% reliability of each component in the set using the "rel_fcn"
comp_reliability = [];
for i=1:num_comp
% if the component has failed, make reliability zero
if comp_set(i,1) == 0
comp_reliability = [comp_reliability 0];
else
if isa(rel_fcn, ’function_handle’)
reliability = rel_fcn(comp_set(i,2), dt, num_years);
else
reliability = exp(-rel_fcn*num_years);
end
comp_reliability = [comp_reliability reliability];
end
end
% Step 4: Compute overall reliability of component set by adding the
% probabilities of all possible combinations of failed/working components
% that lead to a set that is still operational
total_rel = 0;
for i=1:row
% The probability of the combination is equal to the product of the
% reliability / failure of each component, where the status of each
% component is stored in row i of matrix "comp_status".
% For example, if the reliabilities are [0.8 0.9 0.7] and the row of matrix
% "comp_status" is [1 0 0], probability of this combo is (1-0.8)*(0.9)*(0.7)
prob_comb = prod(abs(comp_status(i,:)-comp_reliability));
total_rel = total_rel + prob_comb;
end
156
function comp_set = createComponent(num_comp)
%CREATECOMPONENT Creates array to represent the component set
% A set of components is represented as a (num_comp x 2) array, where
% each row is one component in the set.
%
% * The first column is either a 1 (available) or 0 (failed/offline).
% * The second column stores the number of periods that the component has
% been operational. While a component is held in reserve, the number of
% periods is held at 0.
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 11, 2006
comp_set = [ones(num_comp,1) zeros(num_comp,1)];
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function [comp_set fail_flag] = ...
generalFail(comp_set, num_comp, num_ops, num_needed, dt, fail_fcn)
%GENERALFAIL Generalized component failure function
% For a set of num_comp components, of which num_needed are operational
% at one time, computes which components are operating, which fail and
% which remain online.
%
% INPUTS
% comp_set (num_comp x 2) array that represents the component set
% num_comp Total number of components in the set
% num_ops Number of components operational at one time
% num_needed Minimum number of working components for the set to be operational
% dt Length (in years) of one period
% fail_fcn Either the failure rate (per year) or pointer to hazard rate function
%
% OUTPUTS
% comp_set Updated component set array
% fail_flag If the component set has "failed", set equal to 1
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 11, 2006
% "online_count" tracks how many components have been set as online for the
% period in question
online_count = 0;
fail_flag = 0;
% iterate over all components
for i=1:num_comp
% check if current component (row) is operational and must be online
if (comp_set(i,1) && online_count < num_ops)
% increment online time for the component and the online count
comp_set(i,2) = comp_set(i,2) + dt;
online_count = online_count + 1;
if isa(fail_fcn, ’function_handle’)
fail_prob = fail_fcn(comp_set(i,2), dt);
else
fail_prob = 1-exp(-fail_fcn*dt);
end
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% if the component fails, set to offline
if rand() <= fail_prob
comp_set(i,1) = 0;
end
end
end
% check if there are insufficient online components
if sum(comp_set(:,1)) < num_needed
fail_flag = 1;
end
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function h = hazardGyro(t, dt)
%HAZARDGYRO Outputs the gyro failure rate given the current period.
%
% INPUTS
% t current time of operation for the component (years)
% dt length of one period (years)
%
% OUTPUTS
% h probability of failure in next period (time t < T < t+dt)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 11, 2006
eta = 5.89;
beta = 4.82;
% Rate of Failures in time period "pd"
fail_rate = (beta/eta).*(t./eta).^(beta-1);
% Probability of Failure in one period
h = 1-exp(-fail_rate*dt);
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function pfo = reliabilityGyro(t, dt, num_years)
%RELIABILITYGYRO Calculate future reliability of a gyroscope
% Determines the probability of a gyroscope that is operational at period
% "pd" to be operational "num_years" from that period
%
% INPUTS
% t current age of gyroscope (years)
% dt period length (years)
% num_years future time horizon (years)
%
% OUTPUTS
% pfo probability of working "num_years" years from period "pd"
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 22, 2006
eta = 5.89;
beta = 4.82;
% probability of failure within t years (from Weibull CDF)
F1 = exp(-(t./eta).^beta);
% probability of failure within t+2 years (from Weibull CDF)
F2 = exp(-((t+num_years)./eta).^beta);
pfo = F2./F1;
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function [util] = utilityInstrument(t)
%UTILITYINSTRUMENT Summary of this function goes here
%
% INPUTS
% t time
%
% OUTPUTS
% util utility of instrument technology at time "t"
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% October 2, 2006
p = 0.3218;
util = 10*exp(p * t);
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function [comp_set repair_set] = ...
telescopeRepair(comp_set, repair_set, num_set, num_comp, min_replace_time, diag_flag)
%TELESCOPEREPAIR Perform repair operations on telescope parameters.
% Updates the "comp_set" and "repair_set" variables with the new values
% given when the telescope is repaired
%
% INPUTS
% comp_set cell array with all component sets
% repair_set vector with record of all repairs made to telescope
% num_set number of component sets
% num_comp array with number of components in each set
% min_replace_time minimum life of components replaced during servicing
% diag_flag toggles diagnostic text on/off
%
% OUTPUTS
% comp_set updated "comp_set" cell array (with latest values)
% repair_set updated "repair_set" vector (with latest values)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 18, 2006
for i=1:num_set
for j=1:num_comp(i)
% replace if failed or operating for over specified # periods
if (comp_set{i}(j,1) == 0) || (comp_set{i}(j,2) > min_replace_time)
% record which components were repaired
repair_set(i) = repair_set(i) + 1;
% repair components (return to available status & new)
comp_set{i}(j,1) = 1;
comp_set{i}(j,2) = 0;
end
end
end
if diag_flag
disp(sprintf(’After servicing:’));
for i=1:num_set
disp(comp_set{i}(:,:)’);
end
end
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function [upgrade_times utility] = ...
telescopeUpgrade(upgrade_times, utility, t, dt, upgrade_latency)
%TELESCOPEUPGRADE Perform upgrade operations on telescope parameters.
% Updates the "upgrade_times" and "utility" variables with the new values
% given when the telescope is serviced in "current_period"
%
% INPUTS
% upgrade_times vector with the periods when upgrades took place
% utility vector with the utilities of previous telescope instruments
% t the current time in the analysis
% dt length of one time period (years)
% upgrade_latency time before servicing that the utility of telescope is set
%
% OUTPUTS
% upgrade_times updated "upgrade_times" vector (with latest value)
% utility updated "utility" vector (with latest value)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% July 18, 2006
% compute utility of new instrument (evaluated at "upgrade_latency" years
% before current time "t")
new_util = utilityInstrument((t - upgrade_latency));
% update utility and upgrade_times variables with new values
upgrade_times = [upgrade_times t];
utility = [utility new_util];
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A.3 Cost Models
function [total_cost, varargout] = ...
costAnalysis_Replace(drymass, lifetime, fab_fraction, learn_curve, plot_flag)
%COSTANALYSIS_REPLACE Find total lifecycle cost of a two-telescope program.
%
% INPUTS
% drymass mass of telescope (kg)
% lifetime total lifetime of telescope (years)
% fab_fraction fabrication fraction of initial cost
% learn_curve fraction of init cost that the 2nd iteration will cost
% plot_flag flag = 1 to plot the components of cost
%
% OUTPUTS
% total_cost total lifecycle cost of the replacement program
%
% VARIABLE OUTPUTS
% Will output the following when requested (in order):
% [cost_init1 cost_init2 cost_launch cost_ops cost_sci]
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 22, 2006
% RDT&E / Fabrication cost for telescope 1
cost_init1 = costInitial(drymass);
% RDT&E / Fabrication cost for telescope 2
% Learning curve equation from SMAD pg 809
cost_init2 = costInitial(drymass) * fab_fraction * (2^(1-log(1/learn_curve)/log(2))-1);
% Launch of telescope cost
cost_launch = costLaunch(drymass);
% Operations cost
cost_ops = costOps(cost_init1) * lifetime;
% Science Instruments cost
cost_sci = costScience(drymass) * 2;
% calculate total cost and maximum servicing price
total_cost = cost_init1 + cost_init2 + cost_launch*2 + cost_ops + cost_sci;
% plot components of total cost (if requested)
if plot_flag == 1
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figure
area(drymass’,[cost_init1; cost_init2; cost_launch*2; cost_ops; cost_sci]’)
title(’Lifecycle Cost of Telescope Replacement Program’)
xlabel(’Telescope Dry Mass (kg)’)
ylabel(’Total Lifecycle Cost ($M FY2004)’)
legend(’Initial Cost + Telescope 1’,’Cost of Telescope 2’,’Launch Costs’,...
’Operations Costs’,’Science Instruments’,2)
end
% output cost breakdown data (if requested)
if (nargout > 1)
varargout{1} = cost_init1;
varargout{2} = cost_init2;
varargout{3} = cost_launch;
varargout{4} = cost_ops;
varargout{5} = cost_sci;
end
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function total_cost = costAnalysis_Servicing(drymass, serviceable_inc, EOL,...
num_serv, cost_replace, comp_replace, plot_flag, varargin)
%COSTANALYSIS_SERVICING Find maximum servicing price.
%
% INPUTS
% drymass mass of telescope (kg)
% serviceable_inc amount that RDT&E and Fab is incremented to allow for
% servicing (i.e. a 10% increase => variable = 1.10
% EOL total lifetime of telescope (years)
% num_serv total number of servicing missions
% cost_replace vector of component costs, OR single cost
% comp_replace cell array with components that were replaced, OR
% single aggregate number of components
% plot_flag flag = 1 to plot components of total budget
%
% VARIABLE INPUTS
% budget budgetary constraint (for plotting only)
%
% OUTPUTS
% total_cost total lifecycle cost of the servicing program
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 22, 2006
if plot_flag == 1
budget = varargin{1};
end
% RDT&E / Fabrication cost
cost_init = costInitial(drymass) * serviceable_inc;
% Launch cost
cost_launch = costLaunch(drymass);
% Operations cost
cost_ops = costOps(cost_init) * EOL;
% Science Instruments cost
cost_sci = costScience(drymass) * (num_serv+1);
% Components cost
if iscell(comp_replace)
cost_repairs = costComponents(cost_replace, comp_replace);
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else
cost_repairs = cost_replace * comp_replace;
end
% calculate total cost and maximum servicing price
total_cost = cost_init + cost_launch + cost_ops + cost_sci + cost_repairs;
% plot components of total cost (if requested)
if plot_flag
figure
hold on
area(drymass’,[cost_init; cost_repairs*ones(1,length(drymass));...
cost_launch; cost_ops; cost_sci;]’)
plot(drymass,budget)
hold off
title(’Lifecycle Cost of Telescope Servicing Program’)
xlabel(’Telescope Mass (kg)’)
ylabel(’Total Lifecycle Cost ($M FY2004)’)
legend(’Initial Cost’, ’Component Replacement’, ’Launch Costs’,...
’Operations Costs’, ’Science Instruments’, ’BUDGET’,2)
end
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function cost = costComponents(cost_replace, comp_replace)
%COSTSCIENCE Determine cost of telescope instruments
%
% INPUTS
% cost_replace Vector of component costs ($M, FY2004)
% comp_replace Cell array of cells arrays that indicate which components
% were replaced during each servicing mission.
%
% OUTPUTS
% cost Cost of telescope instrument ($M, FY2004)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 24, 2006
cost = 0;
for i=1:length(comp_replace)
for j=1:length(comp_replace{i})
num_comp_replace = sum(comp_replace{i}{j});
cost = cost + cost_replace(i) * num_comp_replace;
end
end
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function cost = costInitial(drymass)
%COSTINITIAL Determine initial cost of telescope
% Calculates the RDT&E and fabrication cost of the first copy of a
% telescope design. Based on the Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM) by
% NASA JSC (http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/AMCM.html)
%
% INPUTS
% drymass Mass of telescope (kg)
%
% OUTPUTS
% cost Total initial telescope cost ($M, FY2004)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 21, 2006
a=0.000504839;
b=0.594183076;
c=0.653947922;
d=76.99939424;
e=1.68051e-52;
f=-0.355322218;
g=1.554982942;
B = 1;
D = 1;
Q = 1;
S = 2.17;
IOC = 2004;
inf91 = 1.414;
% change to weight in pounds
W = drymass*2.2;
% compute total cost (express in $M)
cost = a * power(Q,b) * power(W,c) * power(d,S) * power(e,(1/(IOC-1900))) *...
power(B,f) * power(g,D) * inf91;
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function cost = costLaunch(drymass)
%COSTLAUNCH Computes launch cost for a given spacecraft mass
%
% INPUTS
% drymass total spacecraft mass launched to LEO (185-200km)
%
% OUTPUTS
% cost total launch cost ($M, FY2004)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 17, 2006
% Falcon 1 LV Family
if (drymass >= 0) && (drymass < 668)
cost(i) = 6;
% *** Placeholder 1 ***
elseif (drymass >= 668) && (drymass < 1220)
cost(i) = 0.02536*drymass - 10.94;
% Taurus LV Family
elseif (drymass >= 1220) && (drymass < 1900)
cost(i) = -0.0000279*drymass^2 + 0.1039*drymass - 64.7;
% Delta II LV Family
elseif (drymass >= 1900) && (drymass < 5139)
cost(i) = 0.0044*drymass + 27.381;
% Linear interpolation
elseif (drymass >= 5139) && (drymass < 8600)
cost(i) = 0.02398*drymass - 73.24;
% Delta IV M+ LV Family
elseif (drymass >= 8600) && (drymass < 11700)
cost(i) = 0.0016*drymass + 119.13;
% Atlas V LV Family
elseif (drymass >= 11700) && (drymass < 20050)
cost(i) = 1.332e-6*drymass^2 - 0.02827*drymass + 283.21;
else cost(i) = NaN;
end
cost = cost .* 0.908; % deflate cost to FY2000 dollars
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function cost = costOps(cost_init)
%COSTOPS Determine yearly operations cost of a telescope
% Based on the Mission Operations Cost Model (MOCM) by NASA JSC
% (http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/MOCM.html)
%
% INPUTS
% cost_init Initial cost of telescope ($M, FY2004)
%
% OUTPUTS
% cost Yearly telescope operations cost ($M, FY2004)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 21, 2006
% set parameters (from MOCM)
INF87= 1.689;
a = 0.047;
b = 0.878;
c = cost_init / INF87;
% compute operations cost (express in $M)
cost = a * power(c,b) * INF87;
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function cost = costScience(drymass)
%COSTSCIENCE Determine cost of telescope instruments
%
% INPUTS
% drymass Dry mass of telescope (kg)
%
% OUTPUTS
% cost Cost of telescope instrument ($M, FY2004)
%
% Mark Baldesarra
% August 24, 2006
% Assume directly proportional to mass (known $100M cost for 11mt telescope)
cost = 100*(drymass/11000);
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